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Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/completeness.tex
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/introduction.tex
Introduction
If source is a modal system, then the soundness theorem establishes that if source, then source is valid in any class source of models in which all instances of all formulas in source are valid. In particular that means that if source then source is true in all models; if source then source is true in all reflexive models; if source then source is true in all serial models, etc.
Completeness is the converse of soundness: that LogK is complete means that if a formula source is valid, source, for instance. Proving completeness is a lot harder to do than proving soundness. It is useful, first, to consider the contrapositive: LogK is complete iff whenever source, there is a countermodel, i.e., a model source such that source. Equivalently (negating source), we could prove that whenever source, there is a model of source. In the construction of such a model, we can use information contained in source. When we find models for specific formulas we often do the same: e.g., if we want to find a countermodel to source, we know that it has to contain a world where source is true and source is false. And a world where source is false means there has to be a world accessible from it where source is false. And that's all we need to know: which worlds make the propositional variables true, and which worlds are accessible from which worlds.
In the case of proving completeness, however, we don't have a specific formula source for which we are constructing a model. We want to establish that a model exists for every source such that source. This is a minimal requirement, since if source, by soundness, there is no model for source (in which source is true). Now note that source iff source is source-consistent. (Recall that source and source are equivalent.) So our task is to construct a model for every source-consistent formula.
The trick we'll use is to find a source-consistent set of formulas that contains source, but also other formulas which tell us what the world that makes source true has to look like. Such sets are complete source-consistent sets. It's not enough to construct a model with a single world to make source true, it will have to contain multiple worlds and an accessibility relation. The complete source-consistent set containing source will also contain other formulas of the form source and source. In all accessible worlds, source has to be true; in at least one, source has to be true. In order to accomplish this, we'll simply take all possible complete source-consistent sets as the basis for the set of worlds. A tricky part will be to figure out when a complete source-consistent set should count as being accessible from another in our model.
We'll show that in the model so defined, source is true at a world---which is also a complete source-consistent set---iff source is an element of that set. If source is source-consistent, it will be an element of at least one complete source-consistent set (a fact we'll prove), and so there will be a world where source is true. So we will have a single model where every source-consistent formula source is true at some world. This single model is the canonical model for source.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/complete-consistent-sets.tex
Complete source-Consistent Sets
Suppose source is a set of modal formulas---think of them as the axioms or defining principles of a normal modal logic. A set source is source-consistent iff source, i.e., if there is no derivation of source from source, where each source. We will construct a “canonical” model in which each world is taken to be a special kind of source-consistent set: one which is not just source-consistent, but maximally so, in the sense that it settles the truth value of every modal formula: for every source, either source or source:
Definition of a complete Sigma consistent set
A set source is complete source-consistent if and only if it is source-consistent and for every source, either source or source.
Complete source-consistent sets source have a number of useful properties. For one, they are deductively closed, i.e., if source then source. This means in particular that every instance of a formula source is also source. Moreover, membership in source mirrors the truth conditions for the propositional connectives. This will be important when we define the “canonical model.”
Properties of complete Sigma consistent sets
Proof
Suppose source but source. Then since source is complete source-consistent, source. This would make source inconsistent, since source.
If source then source, and source by deductive closure, i.e., case the deductive closure clause for complete Sigma consistent sets.
If source, then source, so source would be source-inconsistent.
If source, then by consistency source; and if source then source since source is complete source-consistent.
Exercise.
Suppose source, and source and source. Since source is complete source-consistent, source and source. Then source since source is a tautological instance. This would mean that source is source-inconsistent, a contradiction.
Exercise.
Exercise completing connective cases
probAnd,probOr,probIf,probIff Complete the proof of the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent sets.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/lindenbaums-lemma.tex
Lindenbaum's Lemma
Lindenbaum's Lemma establishes that every source-consistent set of formulas is contained in at least one complete source-consistent set. Our construction of the canonical model will show that for each complete source-consistent set source, there is a world in the canonical model where all and only the formulas in source are true. So Lindenbaum's Lemma guarantees that every source-consistent set is true at some world in the canonical model.
Lindenbaum Lemma
[Lindenbaum's Lemma] If source is source-consistent then there is a complete source-consistent set source extending source.
Proof
Let source, source, dots be an exhaustive listing of all formulas of the language (repetitions are allowed). For instance, start by listing source, and at each stage source list the finitely many formulas of length source using only variables among source, dots, source. We define sets of formulas source by induction on source, and we then set source. We first put source. Supposing that source has been defined, we define source by:
Now let source.
We have to show that this definition actually yields a set source with the required properties, i.e., source and source is complete source-consistent.
It's obvious that source, since source by construction, and source. In fact, source for all source, since source is the union of all source. (Since in each step of the construction, we add a formula to the set already constructed, source, so since source is transitive, source whenever source.) At each stage of the construction, we either add source or source, and every formula appears (at least once) in the list of all source. So, for every source either source or source, so source is complete by definition.
Finally, we have to show, that source is source-consistent. To do this, we show that (a) if source were source-inconsistent, then some source would be source-inconsistent, and (b) all source are source-consistent.
So suppose source were source-inconsistent. Then source, i.e., there are source, dots, source such that source. Since source, each source for some source. Let source be the largest of these. Since source, source. So, all source are in some source. This would mean source, i.e., source is source-inconsistent.
To show that each source is source-consistent, we use a simple induction on source. source, and we assumed source was source-consistent. So the claim holds for source. Now suppose it holds for source, i.e., source is source-consistent. source is either source if that is source-consistent, otherwise it is source. In the first case, source is clearly source-consistent. However, by the proposition on consistency factsthe consistency alternative for a formula and its negation, either source or source is consistent, so source is consistent in the other case as well.
Provability characterized by complete extensions
source if and only if source for each complete source-consistent set source extending source (including when source, in which case we get another characterization of the modal system source.)
Proof
Suppose source, and let source be any complete source-consistent set extending source. If source then by maximality source and so source (by monotonicity) and source (by reflexivity), and so source is inconsistent. Conversely if source, then source is source-consistent, and by Lindenbaum's Lemma there is a complete consistent set source extending source. By consistency, source.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/modalities-ccs.tex
Modalities and Complete Consistent Sets
Explain
When we construct a model source whose set of worlds is given by the complete source-consistent sets source in some normal modal logic source, we will also need to define an accessibility relation source between such “worlds.” We want it to be the case that the accessibility relation (and the assignment source are defined in such a way that source iff source. How should we do this?
Once the accessibility relation is defined, the definition of truth at a world ensures that source iff source for all source such that source
. The proof that source iff source requires that this is true in particular for formulas starting with a modal operator, i.e., source iff source . Combining this requirement with the definition of truth at a world for source yields:
Consider the left-to-right direction: it says that if source, then source for any source and any source with source. If we stipulate that source iff source for all source, then this holds. We can write the condition on the right of the “iff” more compactly as: source.
So the question is: does this definition of source in fact guarantee that source iff source? Does it also guarantee that source iff source? The next few results will establish this.
Box and diamond operations on sets of formulas
If source is a set of formulas, let
In other words, source is source with source in front of every formula in source; source is all the source'ed formulas of source with the initial source's removed. This definition is not terribly important on its own, but will simplify the notation considerably.
Note that source:
i.e., it's just the set of all those formulas of source that start with source.
Lifting a derivation under necessity
Proof
If source then there are source, dots, source such that source. Since source is normal, by rule RK, source, where obviously source, dots, source. Hence, by definition, source.
Derivation from inverse-box premises
Proof
Suppose source; then by the lemma lifting a derivation into boxed premises and conclusion, source. But since source, also source by monotonicity.
Complete-set characterization of necessity
If source is complete source-consistent, then source if and only if for every complete source-consistent source such that source, it holds that source.
Proof
Suppose source is complete source-consistent. The “only if” direction is easy: Suppose source and that source. Since source, source, so source.
For the “if” direction, we prove the contrapositive: Suppose source. Since source is complete source-consistent, it is deductively closed, and hence source. By the lemma deriving a boxed conclusion from inverse-box premises, source. By the proposition on consistency factsthe consistency fact for adding a negated formula, source is source-consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is a complete source-consistent set source such that source. By consistency, source.
Equivalence of box and diamond accessibility conditions
Suppose source and source are complete source-consistent. Then source if and only if source.
Proof
“Only if” direction: Assume source and suppose source (i.e., source). In order to show source, it suffices to show source, for then by maximality, source. Now, if source then by hypothesis source, against the consistency of source (since source). Hence source, as required.
“If” direction: Assume source. We argue contrapositively: suppose source in order to show source. If source then by maximality source and so by hypothesis source. But in a normal modal logic source is equivalent to source, and if the latter is in source, by consistency source, as required.
Complete-set characterization of possibility
If source is complete source-consistent, then source if and only if for some complete source-consistent source such that source, it holds that source.
Proof
Suppose source is complete source-consistent. source iff source by Dual and closure. source iff source by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets since source is complete source-consistent. By the complete-consistent-set characterization of necessity, source iff, for some complete source-consistent source with source, source. Now consider any such source. By the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, source iff source. Also, source iff source by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets. So source iff, for some complete source-consistent source with source, source.
Exercise proving the alternate modal characterization
Show that if source is complete source-consistent, then source if and only if there is a complete source-consistent source such that source and source.
Do this without using the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/canonical-models.tex
Canonical Models
The canonical model for a modal system source is a specific model source in which the worlds are all complete source-consistent sets. Its accessibility relation source and valuation source are defined so as to guarantee that the formulas true at a world source are exactly the formulas making up source.
Definition of the canonical model
Let source be a normal modal logic. The canonical model for source is source, where:
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/truth-lemma.tex
The Truth Lemma
The canonical model source is defined in such a way that source iff source. For propositional variables, the definition of source yields this directly. We have to verify that the equivalence holds for all formulas, however. We do this by induction. The inductive step involves proving the equivalence for formulas involving propositional operators (where we have to use the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent sets) and the modal operators (where we invoke the results of the section on modalities and complete consistent sets).
Truth Lemma
[Truth Lemma] For every formula source, source if and only if source.
Proof
By induction on source.
Case: source
source by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, and source by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe falsity clause for complete Sigma consistent sets.
Case: source
source iff source by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model. Also, source iff source by definition of source.
Case: source
source iff source (the definition of truth at a world in a modal model) iff source (by inductive hypothesis) iff source (by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets).
Case: source
Exercise.
Case: source
source iff source or source (by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model) iff source or source (by inductive hypothesis) iff source (by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe disjunction clause for complete Sigma consistent sets).
Case: source
Exercise.
Case: source
First suppose that source. By the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, for every source such that source, source. By inductive hypothesis, for every source such that source, source. By definition of source, for every source such that source, source. By the complete-consistent-set characterization of necessity, source.
Now assume source. Let source be such that source, i.e., source. Since source, source. Consequently, source. By inductive hypothesis, source. Since source is arbitrary with source, for all source such that source, source. By the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, source.
Case: source
Exercise.
Exercise completing Truth Lemma cases
probFalse,probTrue,probNot,proband,probOr,probIf,probIff,probBox,probDiamond Complete the proof of the Truth Lemma.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/completeness-K.tex
Determination and Completeness for LogK
We are now prepared to use the canonical model to establish completeness. Completeness follows from the fact that the formulas true in the canonical model for source are exactly the source-derivable ones. Models with this property are said to determine source.
Definition of determination by a model
A model source determines a normal modal logic source precisely when source if and only if source, for all formulas source.
Determination by the canonical model
Proof
If source, then for every complete source-consistent source, we have source. Hence, by the Truth Lemma, source for every complete source-consistent source, whence by the complete-consistent-set characterization of provability (with source), source.
Conversely, if source then by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe deductive closure clause for complete Sigma consistent sets, every complete source-consistent source contains source, and hence by the Truth Lemma, source for every source, i.e., source.
Since the canonical model for LogK determines LogK, we immediately have completeness of LogK as a corollary:
Completeness of basic modal logic K
The basic modal logic LogK is complete with respect to the class of all models, i.e., if source then source.
Proof
Contrapositively, if source then by Determination source and hence source is not valid.
For the general case of completeness of a system source with respect to a class of models, e.g., of LogKTB4 with respect to the class of reflexive, symmetric, transitive models, determination alone is not enough. We must also show that the canonical model for the system source is a member of the class, which does not follow obviously from the canonical model construction---nor is it always true!
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/frame-completeness.tex
Frame Completeness
The completeness theorem for LogK can be extended to other modal systems, once we show that the canonical model for a given logic has the corresponding frame property.
Canonical correspondence theorem
If a normal modal logic source contains one of the formulas on the left-hand side of the table of basic modal correspondence facts, then the canonical model for source has the corresponding property on the right-hand side.
Basic correspondence facts table
[htp] centering
Basic correspondence facts rows
Correspondence table. Column headers: if Sigma contains the axiom schema; the canonical model for Sigma has the stated property. Row one, axiom D, necessarily formula A implies possibly formula A; property serial. Row two, axiom T, necessarily formula A implies formula A; property reflexive. Row three, axiom B, formula A implies necessarily possibly formula A; property symmetric. Row four, axiom four, necessarily formula A implies necessarily necessarily formula A; property transitive. Row five, axiom five, possibly formula A implies necessarily possibly formula A; property euclidean. End table.
| axiom schema contained in Sigma | canonical-model property | |
|---|---|---|
| source | source | serial |
| source | source | reflexive |
| source | source | symmetric |
| source | source | transitive |
| source | source | euclidean |
captionBasic correspondence facts.
Proof
We take each of these up in turn.
Suppose source contains AxD, and let source; we need to show that there is a source such that source. It suffices to show that source is source-consistent, for then by Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is a complete source-consistent set source, and by definition of source we have source. So, suppose for contradiction that source is not source-consistent, i.e., source. By the lemma deriving a boxed conclusion from inverse-box premises, source, and since source contains AxD, also source. But source is normal, so source (the normal-modal theorem that falsity is not possible), whence also source, against the consistency of source.
Now suppose source contains AxT, and let source. We want to show source, i.e., source. But if source then by AxT also source, as desired.
Now suppose source contains AxB, and suppose source for source, source. We need to show that source, i.e., source. By the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, this is equivalent to source. So suppose source. By AxB, also source. By the hypothesis that source , we have that source, and hence source, as required.
Now suppose source contains Ax4, and suppose source and source. We need to show source. From the hypothesis we have both source and source. In order to show source it suffices to show source. So let source, i.e., source. By Ax4, also source and by hypothesis we get, first, that source and, second, that source, as desired.
Now suppose source contains Ax5, suppose source and source. We need to show source. The first hypothesis gives source , and the second hypothesis is equivalent to source , by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions . To show source , by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, it suffices to show source. So let source, i.e., source. By the second hypothesis source and by Ax5, source as well. But now the first hypothesis gives source, as desired.
As a corollary we obtain completeness results for a number of systems. For instance, we know that source is complete with respect to the class of all reflexive euclidean models, which is the same as the class of all reflexive, symmetric and transitive models.
Determination by intersected model classes
Let source, source, source, source, and source be the class of all serial, reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and euclidean models (respectively). Then for any schemas source, dots, source among AxD, AxT, AxB, Ax4, and Ax5, the system source is determined by the class of models source.
Additional canonical-frame correspondences
Let source be a normal modal logic; then:
If source contains the schema source then the canonical model for source is partially functional.
If source contains the schema source then the canonical model for source is functional.
If source contains the schema source then the canonical model for source is weakly dense.
(see the table of additional frame correspondences for definitions of these frame properties).
Proof
Suppose that source contains the schema source, to show that source is partially functional we need to prove that for any source, source, source, if source and source then source. Since source we have source and since source also source . The identity source will follow if we can establish the two inclusions source and source. For the first inclusion, let source; then source, and by the schema and deductive closure of source also source, whence by the hypothesis that source, source. The second inclusion is similar.
This follows immediately from part the first additional canonical-frame property and the seriality proof in the canonical-frame correspondence theorem.
Suppose source contains the schema source and to show that source is weakly dense, let source. We need to show that there is a complete source-consistent set source such that source and source. Let:
It suffices to show that source is source-consistent, for then by Lindenbaum's Lemma it can be extended to a complete source-consistent set source such that source and source, i.e., source and source (by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions) .
Suppose for contradiction that source is not consistent. Then there are formulas source, dots, source and source, dots, source such that
Since source is derivable in every normal modal logic, we argue as follows, contradicting the consistency of source:
On the strength of these examples, one might think that every system source of modal logic is complete, in the sense that it proves every formula which is valid in every frame in which every theorem of source is valid. Unfortunately, there are many systems that are not complete in this sense.
Source disclosures
- TR053-SAR-001: Source anomaly. In the negation case, the second clause says that if A does not belong to Gamma then A belongs to Gamma. Completeness would ordinarily yield not A in Gamma. The printed claim is preserved and no proof repair is supplied. source
- TR053-SAR-002: Source anomaly. The converse of the biconditional membership clause begins by assuming that the conditional from A to B is absent, although the next sentence invokes the negation of the biconditional. The wording and formulas are preserved without substitution. source
- TR053-SAR-003: Source index caveat. The premise list ends at B sub k, while the nested conditional and its boxed version end at B sub n. Both indices are retained. source
- TR053-SAR-004: Source TeX caveat. Nested dollar delimiters split the canonical world-set formula in the frozen delimiter census. The exact source and both frozen fragment identifiers are preserved, while one explicit composite MathML object presents the complete definition. source