Normal Modal Logics

Completeness and Canonical Models

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Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/completeness.tex

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/introduction.tex

Introduction

If Σ\Sigmasource is a modal system, then the soundness theorem establishes that if Σ⊢A\Sigma \Proves !Asource, then A!Asource is valid in any class C\mClass{C}source of models in which all instances of all formulas in Σ\Sigmasource are valid. In particular that means that if K⊢A\Log{K} \Proves !Asource then A!Asource is true in all models; if KT⊢A\Log{KT} \Proves !Asource then A!Asource is true in all reflexive models; if KD⊢A\Log{KD} \Proves !Asource then A!Asource is true in all serial models, etc.

Completeness is the converse of soundness: that LogK is complete means that if a formula A!Asource is valid, ⊢A\Proves !Asource, for instance. Proving completeness is a lot harder to do than proving soundness. It is useful, first, to consider the contrapositive: LogK is complete iff whenever ⊬A\Proves/ !Asource, there is a countermodel, i.e., a model M\mModel{M}source such that M⊮A\mSat/{M}{!A}source. Equivalently (negating A!Asource), we could prove that whenever ⊬¬A\Proves/ \lnot !Asource, there is a model of A!Asource. In the construction of such a model, we can use information contained in A!Asource. When we find models for specific formulas we often do the same: e.g., if we want to find a countermodel to p→□qp \lif \Box qsource, we know that it has to contain a world where ppsource is true and □q\Box qsource is false. And a world where □q\Box qsource is false means there has to be a world accessible from it where qqsource is false. And that's all we need to know: which worlds make the propositional variables true, and which worlds are accessible from which worlds.

In the case of proving completeness, however, we don't have a specific formula A!Asource for which we are constructing a model. We want to establish that a model exists for every A!Asource such that ⊬Σ¬A\Proves/[\Sigma] \lnot !Asource. This is a minimal requirement, since if ⊢Σ¬A\Proves[\Sigma] \lnot !Asource, by soundness, there is no model for A!Asource (in which Σ\Sigmasource is true). Now note that ⊬Σ¬A\Proves/[\Sigma] \lnot !Asource iff A!Asource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. (Recall that Σ⊬Σ¬A\Sigma \Proves/[\Sigma] \lnot !Asource and A⊬Σ⊥!A \Proves/[\Sigma] \lfalsesource are equivalent.) So our task is to construct a model for every Σ\Sigmasource-consistent formula.

The trick we'll use is to find a Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set of formulas that contains A!Asource, but also other formulas which tell us what the world that makes A!Asource true has to look like. Such sets are complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent sets. It's not enough to construct a model with a single world to make A!Asource true, it will have to contain multiple worlds and an accessibility relation. The complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set containing A!Asource will also contain other formulas of the form □B\Box !Bsource and ◇C\Diamond !Csource. In all accessible worlds, B!Bsource has to be true; in at least one, C!Csource has to be true. In order to accomplish this, we'll simply take all possible complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent sets as the basis for the set of worlds. A tricky part will be to figure out when a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set should count as being accessible from another in our model.

We'll show that in the model so defined, A!Asource is true at a world---which is also a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set---iff A!Asource is an element of that set. If A!Asource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, it will be an element of at least one complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set (a fact we'll prove), and so there will be a world where A!Asource is true. So we will have a single model where every Σ\Sigmasource-consistent formula A!Asource is true at some world. This single model is the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/complete-consistent-sets.tex

Complete Σ\Sigmasource-Consistent Sets

Suppose Σ\Sigmasource is a set of modal formulas---think of them as the axioms or defining principles of a normal modal logic. A set Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent iff Γ⊬Σ⊥\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] \lfalsesource, i.e., if there is no derivation of A1→(A2→⋯(An→⊥)…)!A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_n \lif \lfalse)\dots)source from Σ\Sigmasource, where each Ai∈Γ!A_i \in \Gammasource. We will construct a “canonical” model in which each world is taken to be a special kind of Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set: one which is not just Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, but maximally so, in the sense that it settles the truth value of every modal formula: for every A!Asource, either A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource or ¬A∈Γ\lnot !A \in \Gammasource:

Definition of a complete Sigma consistent set

A set Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent if and only if it is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent and for every A!Asource, either A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource or ¬A∈Γ\lnot !A \in \Gammasource.

Complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent sets Γ\Gammasource have a number of useful properties. For one, they are deductively closed, i.e., if Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource then A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource. This means in particular that every instance of a formula A∈Σ!A \in \Sigmasource is also ∈Γ\in \Gammasource. Moreover, membership in Γ\Gammasource mirrors the truth conditions for the propositional connectives. This will be important when we define the “canonical model.”

Properties of complete Sigma consistent sets

Suppose Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. Then:

  1. Γ\Gammasource is deductively closed in Σ\Sigmasource.

  2. Σ⊆Γ\Sigma \subseteq \Gammasource.

  3. ⊥∉Γ\lfalse \notin \Gammasource

  4. ¬A∈Γ\lnot!A \in \Gammasource if and only if A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource.

  5. A∧B∈Γ!A \land !B \in \Gammasource iff A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource and B∈Γ!B \in \Gammasource

  6. A∨B∈Γ!A \lor !B \in \Gammasource iff A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource or B∈Γ!B \in \Gammasource

  7. A→B∈Γ!A \lif !B \in \Gammasource iff A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource or B∈Γ!B \in \Gammasource

Proof

  1. Suppose Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource but A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource. Then since Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, ¬A∈Γ\lnot!A \in \Gammasource. This would make Γ\Gammasource inconsistent, since A,¬A⊢Σ⊥!A, \lnot !A \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource.

  2. If A∈Σ!A \in \Sigmasource then Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource, and A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource by deductive closure, i.e., case the deductive closure clause for complete Sigma consistent sets.

  3. If ⊥∈Γ\lfalse \in \Gammasource, then Γ⊢Σ⊥\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource, so Γ\Gammasource would be Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent.

  4. If ¬A∈Γ\lnot!A \in \Gammasource, then by consistency A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource; and if A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource then A∈Γ!A \in \Gammasource since Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent.

  5. Exercise.

  6. Suppose A∨B∈Γ!A \lor !B \in \Gammasource, and A∉Γ!A \notin \Gammasource and B∉Γ!B \notin \Gammasource. Since Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, ¬A∈Γ\lnot!A \in \Gammasource and ¬B∈Γ\lnot !B \in \Gammasource. Then ¬(A∨B)∈Γ\lnot(!A \lor !B) \in \Gammasource since ¬A→(¬B→¬(A∨B))\lnot !A \lif (\lnot !B \lif \lnot (!A \lor !B))source is a tautological instance. This would mean that Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent, a contradiction.

  7. Exercise.

Exercise completing connective cases

probAnd,probOr,probIf,probIff Complete the proof of the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent sets.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/lindenbaums-lemma.tex

Lindenbaum's Lemma

Lindenbaum's Lemma establishes that every Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set of formulas is contained in at least one complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set. Our construction of the canonical model will show that for each complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ\Deltasource, there is a world in the canonical model where all and only the formulas in Δ\Deltasource are true. So Lindenbaum's Lemma guarantees that every Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set is true at some world in the canonical model.

Lindenbaum Lemma

[Lindenbaum's Lemma] If Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent then there is a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ\Deltasource extending Γ\Gammasource.

Proof

Let A0!A_0source, A1!A_1source, dots be an exhaustive listing of all formulas of the language (repetitions are allowed). For instance, start by listing p0\Obj p_0source, and at each stage n≥1n \ge 1source list the finitely many formulas of length nnsource using only variables among p0\Obj p_0source, dots, pn\Obj p_nsource. We define sets of formulas Δn\Delta_nsource by induction on nnsource, and we then set Δ=⋃nΔn\Delta = \bigcup_n \Delta_nsource. We first put Δ0=Γ\Delta_0 = \Gammasource. Supposing that Δn\Delta_nsource has been defined, we define Δn+1\Delta_{n+1}source by:

Δn+1={Δn∪{An},if Δn∪{An} is Σ-consistent;Δn∪{¬An},otherwise.\Delta_{n+1} = \begin{cases} \Delta_n \cup \{!A_n\}, & \text{if $\Delta_n \cup \{ !A_n\}$ is $\Sigma$-consistent;} \\ \Delta_n \cup \{ \lnot !A_n\}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}source

Now let Δ=⋃n=0∞Δn\Delta = \bigcup_{n=0}^\infty \Delta_nsource.

We have to show that this definition actually yields a set Δ\Deltasource with the required properties, i.e., Γ⊆Δ\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource and Δ\Deltasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent.

It's obvious that Γ⊆Δ\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource, since Δ0⊆Δ\Delta_0 \subseteq \Deltasource by construction, and Δ0=Γ\Delta_0 = \Gammasource. In fact, Δn⊆Δ\Delta_n \subseteq \Deltasource for all nnsource, since Δ\Deltasource is the union of all Δn\Delta_nsource. (Since in each step of the construction, we add a formula to the set already constructed, Δn⊆Δn+1\Delta_n \subseteq \Delta_{n+1}source, so since ⊆\subseteqsource is transitive, Δn⊆Δm\Delta_n \subseteq \Delta_{m}source whenever n≤mn \le msource.) At each stage of the construction, we either add An!A_nsource or ¬An\lnot !A_nsource, and every formula appears (at least once) in the list of all An!A_nsource. So, for every A!Asource either A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource or ¬A∈Δ\lnot !A \in \Deltasource, so Δ\Deltasource is complete by definition.

Finally, we have to show, that Δ\Deltasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. To do this, we show that (a) if Δ\Deltasource were Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent, then some Δn\Delta_nsource would be Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent, and (b) all Δn\Delta_nsource are Σ\Sigmasource-consistent.

So suppose Δ\Deltasource were Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent. Then Δ⊢Σ⊥\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource, i.e., there are A1!A_1source, dots, Ak∈Δ!A_k \in \Deltasource such that Σ⊢A1→(A2→⋯(Ak→⊥)…)\Sigma \Proves !A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_k \lif \lfalse)\dots)source. Since Δ=⋃n=0∞Δn\Delta = \bigcup_{n=0}^\infty \Delta_nsource, each Ai∈Δni!A_i \in \Delta_{n_i}source for some nin_isource. Let nnsource be the largest of these. Since ni≤nn_i \le nsource, Δni⊆Δn\Delta_{n_i} \subseteq \Delta_nsource. So, all Ai!A_isource are in some Δn\Delta_nsource. This would mean Δn⊢Σ⊥\Delta_n \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource, i.e., Δn\Delta_nsource is Σ\Sigmasource-inconsistent.

To show that each Δn\Delta_nsource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, we use a simple induction on nnsource. Δ0=Γ\Delta_0 = \Gammasource, and we assumed Γ\Gammasource was Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. So the claim holds for n=0n = 0source. Now suppose it holds for nnsource, i.e., Δn\Delta_nsource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. Δn+1\Delta_{n+1}source is either Δn∪{An}\Delta_n \cup \{!A_n\}source if that is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, otherwise it is Δn∪{¬An}\Delta_n \cup \{\lnot!A_n\}source. In the first case, Δn+1\Delta_{n+1}source is clearly Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. However, by the proposition on consistency factsthe consistency alternative for a formula and its negation, either Δn∪{An}\Delta_n \cup \{!A_n\}source or Δn∪{¬An}\Delta_n \cup \{\lnot!A_n\}source is consistent, so Δn+1\Delta_{n+1}source is consistent in the other case as well.

Provability characterized by complete extensions

Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource if and only if A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource for each complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ\Deltasource extending Γ\Gammasource (including when Γ=∅\Gamma = \emptysetsource, in which case we get another characterization of the modal system Σ\Sigmasource.)

Proof

Suppose Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource, and let Δ\Deltasource be any complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set extending Γ\Gammasource. If A∉Δ!A \notin \Deltasource then by maximality ¬A∈Δ\lnot!A \in \Deltasource and so Δ⊢ΣA\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource (by monotonicity) and Δ⊢Σ¬A\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \lnot!Asource (by reflexivity), and so Δ\Deltasource is inconsistent. Conversely if Γ⊬ΣA\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] !Asource, then Γ∪{¬A}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A\}source is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, and by Lindenbaum's Lemma there is a complete consistent set Δ\Deltasource extending Γ∪{¬A}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \}source. By consistency, A∉Δ!A \notin \Deltasource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/modalities-ccs.tex

Modalities and Complete Consistent Sets

Explain

When we construct a model MΣ\mModel{M^\Sigma}source whose set of worlds is given by the complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent sets Δ\Deltasource in some normal modal logic Σ\Sigmasource, we will also need to define an accessibility relation RΣR^\Sigmasource between such “worlds.” We want it to be the case that the accessibility relation (and the assignment VΣ)V^\Sigma)source are defined in such a way that MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source iff A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource. How should we do this?

Once the accessibility relation is defined, the definition of truth at a world ensures that MΣ⊩□A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Box!A}[\Delta]source iff MΣ⊩A[Δ′]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta']source for all Δ′\Delta'source such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma\Delta\Delta'source

. The proof that MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source iff A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource requires that this is true in particular for formulas starting with a modal operator, i.e., MΣ⊩□A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Box!A}[\Delta]source iff □A∈Δ\Box !A \in \Deltasource . Combining this requirement with the definition of truth at a world for □A\Box !Asource yields:

□A∈Δ iff A∈Δ′ for all Δ′ with RΣΔΔ′\Box!A \in \Delta \text{ iff } !A \in \Delta' \text{ for all $\Delta'$ with } R^\Sigma\Delta\Delta'source

Consider the left-to-right direction: it says that if □A∈Δ\Box !A \in \Deltasource, then A∈Δ′!A \in \Delta'source for any A!Asource and any Δ′\Delta'source with RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma\Delta\Delta'source. If we stipulate that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma\Delta\Delta'source iff A∈Δ′!A \in \Delta'source for all □A∈Δ\Box!A \in \Deltasource, then this holds. We can write the condition on the right of the “iff” more compactly as: {A:□A∈Δ}⊆Δ′\Setabs{!A}{\Box!A \in \Delta} \subseteq \Delta'source.

So the question is: does this definition of RΣR^\Sigmasource in fact guarantee that □A∈Δ\Box !A \in \Deltasource iff MΣ⊩□A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Box !A}[\Delta]source? Does it also guarantee that ◇A∈Δ\Diamond !A \in \Deltasource iff MΣ⊩◇A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Diamond !A}[\Delta]source? The next few results will establish this.

Box and diamond operations on sets of formulas

If Γ\Gammasource is a set of formulas, let

□Γ={□B:B∈Γ}◇Γ={◇B:B∈Γ}and□−1Γ={B:□B∈Γ}◇−1Γ={B:◇B∈Γ}\Box\Gamma & = \Setabs{\Box !B}{!B \in \Gamma}\\ \Diamond\Gamma & = \Setabs{\Diamond !B}{!B \in \Gamma}\\ \intertext{and} \Box^{-1}\Gamma & = \Setabs{!B}{\Box !B \in \Gamma}\\ \Diamond^{-1}\Gamma & = \Setabs{!B}{\Diamond !B \in \Gamma}\\source

In other words, □Γ\Box\Gammasource is Γ\Gammasource with □\Boxsource in front of every formula in Γ\Gammasource; □−1Γ\Box^{-1}\Gammasource is all the □\Boxsource'ed formulas of Γ\Gammasource with the initial □\Boxsource's removed. This definition is not terribly important on its own, but will simplify the notation considerably.

Note that □□−1Γ⊆Γ\Box\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Gammasource:

□□−1Γ={□B:□B∈Γ}\Box\Box^{-1}\Gamma = \Setabs{\Box!B}{\Box!B \in \Gamma}source

i.e., it's just the set of all those formulas of Γ\Gammasource that start with □\Boxsource.

Lifting a derivation under necessity

If Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource then □Γ⊢Σ□A\Box\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \Box !Asource.

Proof

If Γ⊢ΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource then there are B1!B_1source, dots, Bk∈Γ!B_k \in \Gammasource such that Σ⊢B1→(B2→⋯(Bn→A)⋯)\Sigma \Proves !B_1 \lif (!B_2 \lif \cdots (!B_n \lif !A)\cdots)source. Since Σ\Sigmasource is normal, by rule RK, Σ⊢□B1→(□B2→⋯(□Bn→□A)⋯)\Sigma \Proves \Box!B_1 \lif (\Box!B_2 \lif \cdots (\Box!B_n \lif \Box!A)\cdots)source, where obviously □B1\Box!B_1source, dots, □Bk∈□Γ\Box!B_k \in \Box\Gammasource. Hence, by definition, □Γ⊢Σ□A\Box\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \Box !Asource.

Derivation from inverse-box premises

If □−1Γ⊢ΣA\Box^{-1} \Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource then Γ⊢Σ□A\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \Box!Asource.

Proof

Suppose □−1Γ⊢ΣA\Box^{-1}\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource; then by the lemma lifting a derivation into boxed premises and conclusion, □□−1Γ⊢□A\Box\Box^{-1}\Gamma \Proves \Box!Asource. But since □□−1Γ⊆Γ\Box\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Gammasource, also Γ⊢Σ□A\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \Box!Asource by monotonicity.

Complete-set characterization of necessity

If Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, then □A∈Γ\Box !A \in \Gammasource if and only if for every complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource such that □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1} \Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource, it holds that A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

Proof

Suppose Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. The “only if” direction is easy: Suppose □A∈Γ\Box !A \in \Gammasource and that □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource. Since □A∈Γ\Box!A \in \Gammasource, A∈□−1Γ⊆Δ!A \in \Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource, so A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

For the “if” direction, we prove the contrapositive: Suppose □A∉Γ\Box!A \notin \Gammasource. Since Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, it is deductively closed, and hence Γ⊬Σ□A\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] \Box !Asource. By the lemma deriving a boxed conclusion from inverse-box premises, □−1Γ⊬ΣA\Box^{-1}\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] !Asource. By the proposition on consistency factsthe consistency fact for adding a negated formula, □−1Γ∪{¬A}\Box^{-1}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \}source is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. By Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ\Deltasource such that □−1Γ∪{¬A}⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \} \subseteq \Deltasource. By consistency, A∉Δ!A \notin \Deltasource.

Equivalence of box and diamond accessibility conditions

Suppose Γ\Gammasource and Δ\Deltasource are complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. Then □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource if and only if ◇Δ⊆Γ\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Gammasource.

Proof

“Only if” direction: Assume □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource and suppose ◇A∈◇Δ\Diamond!A \in \Diamond\Deltasource (i.e., A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource). In order to show ◇A∈Γ\Diamond!A \in \Gammasource, it suffices to show □¬A∉Γ\Box\lnot!A \notin \Gammasource, for then by maximality, ¬□¬A∈Γ\lnot\Box\lnot !A \in \Gammasource. Now, if □¬A∈Γ\Box\lnot!A \in \Gammasource then by hypothesis ¬A∈Δ\lnot!A \in \Deltasource, against the consistency of Δ\Deltasource (since A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource). Hence □¬A∉Γ\Box\lnot!A \notin \Gammasource, as required.

“If” direction: Assume ◇Δ⊆Γ\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Gammasource. We argue contrapositively: suppose A∉Δ!A \notin \Deltasource in order to show □A∉Γ\Box!A \notin \Gammasource. If A∉Δ!A \notin \Deltasource then by maximality ¬A∈Δ\lnot!A \in \Deltasource and so by hypothesis ◇¬A∈Γ\Diamond\lnot!A \in \Gammasource. But in a normal modal logic ◇¬A\Diamond\lnot!Asource is equivalent to ¬□A\lnot\Box !Asource, and if the latter is in Γ\Gammasource, by consistency □A∉Γ\Box!A \notin\Gammasource, as required.

Complete-set characterization of possibility

If Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, then ◇A∈Γ\Diamond !A \in \Gammasource if and only if for some complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource such that ◇Δ⊆Γ\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Gammasource, it holds that A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

Proof

Suppose Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. ◇A∈Γ\Diamond!A \in \Gammasource iff ¬□¬A∈Γ\lnot\Box\lnot !A \in \Gammasource by Dual and closure. ¬□¬A∈Γ\lnot\Box\lnot !A \in \Gammasource iff □¬A∉Γ\Box\lnot !A \notin \Gammasource by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets since Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. By the complete-consistent-set characterization of necessity, □¬A∉Γ\Box\lnot !A \notin \Gammasource iff, for some complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource with □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource, ¬A∉Δ\lnot!A \notin \Deltasource. Now consider any such Δ\Deltasource. By the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource iff ◇Δ⊆Γ\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Gammasource. Also, ¬A∉Δ\lnot !A \notin \Deltasource iff A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets. So ◇A∈Γ\Diamond!A \in \Gammasource iff, for some complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource with ◇Δ⊆Γ\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Gammasource, A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

Exercise proving the alternate modal characterization

Show that if Γ\Gammasource is complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, then ◇A∈Γ\Diamond !A \in \Gammasource if and only if there is a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource such that □−1Γ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource and A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

Do this without using the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/canonical-models.tex

Canonical Models

The canonical model for a modal system Σ\Sigmasource is a specific model MΣ\mModel{M^\Sigma}source in which the worlds are all complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent sets. Its accessibility relation RΣR^\Sigmasource and valuation VΣV^\Sigmasource are defined so as to guarantee that the formulas true at a world Δ\Deltasource are exactly the formulas making up Δ\Deltasource.

Definition of the canonical model

Let Σ\Sigmasource be a normal modal logic. The canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource is MΣ=⟨WΣ,RΣ,VΣ⟩\mModel{M}^\Sigma = \tuple{W^\Sigma, R^\Sigma, V^\Sigma}source, where:

  1. WΣ={Δ:Δ is complete Σ-consistent}W^\Sigma = \Setabs{ \Delta }{\Delta \text{ is complete $\Sigma$-consistent} }source.

  2. RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source holds if and only if □−1Δ⊆Δ′\Box^{-1}\Delta \subseteq \Delta'source .

  3. VΣ(p)={Δ:p∈Δ}V^\Sigma(p) = \Setabs{\Delta}{p \in \Delta}source.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/truth-lemma.tex

The Truth Lemma

The canonical model MΣ\mModel{M^\Sigma}source is defined in such a way that MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source iff A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource. For propositional variables, the definition of VΣV^\Sigmasource yields this directly. We have to verify that the equivalence holds for all formulas, however. We do this by induction. The inductive step involves proving the equivalence for formulas involving propositional operators (where we have to use the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent sets) and the modal operators (where we invoke the results of the section on modalities and complete consistent sets).

Truth Lemma

[Truth Lemma] For every formula A!Asource, MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source if and only if A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource.

Proof

By induction on A!Asource.

  1. Case: A≡⊥!A \ident \lfalsesource

    MΣ⊮⊥[Δ]\mSat/{M^\Sigma}{\lfalse}[\Delta]source by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, and ⊥∉Δ\lfalse \notin \Deltasource by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe falsity clause for complete Sigma consistent sets.

  2. Case: A≡p!A \ident psource

    MΣ⊩p[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{p}[\Delta]source iff Δ∈VΣ(p)\Delta \in V^\Sigma(p)source by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model. Also, Δ∈VΣ(p)\Delta \in V^\Sigma(p)source iff p∈Δp \in \Deltasource by definition of VΣV^\Sigmasource.

  3. Case: A≡¬B!A \ident \lnot !Bsource

    MΣ⊩¬B[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\lnot !B}[\Delta]source iff MΣ⊮B[Δ]\mSat/{M^\Sigma}{!B}[\Delta]source (the definition of truth at a world in a modal model) iff B∉Δ!B \notin \Deltasource (by inductive hypothesis) iff ¬B∈Δ\lnot !B \in \Deltasource (by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe negation clause for complete Sigma consistent sets).

  4. Case: A≡B∧C!A \ident !B \land !Csource

    Exercise.

  5. Case: A≡B∨C!A \ident !B \lor !Csource

    MΣ⊩B∨C[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!B \lor !C}[\Delta]source iff MΣ⊩B[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!B}[\Delta]source or MΣ⊩C[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!C}[\Delta]source (by the definition of truth at a world in a modal model) iff B∈Δ!B \in \Deltasource or C∈Δ!C \in \Deltasource (by inductive hypothesis) iff B∨C∈Δ!B \lor !C \in \Deltasource (by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe disjunction clause for complete Sigma consistent sets).

  6. Case: A≡B→C!A \ident !B \lif !Csource

    Exercise.

  7. Case: A≡□B!A \ident \Box !Bsource

    First suppose that MΣ⊩□B[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Box !B}[\Delta]source. By the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, for every Δ′\Delta'source such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source, MΣ⊩B[Δ′]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!B}[\Delta']source. By inductive hypothesis, for every Δ′\Delta'source such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source, B∈Δ′!B \in \Delta'source. By definition of RΣR^\Sigmasource, for every Δ′\Delta'source such that □−1Δ⊆Δ′\Box^{-1} \Delta \subseteq \Delta'source, B∈Δ′!B \in \Delta'source. By the complete-consistent-set characterization of necessity, □B∈Δ\Box !B \in \Deltasource.

    Now assume □B∈Δ\Box !B \in \Deltasource. Let Δ′∈WΣ\Delta' \in W^\Sigmasource be such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source, i.e., □−1Δ⊆Δ′\Box^{-1}\Delta \subseteq \Delta'source. Since □B∈Δ\Box !B \in \Deltasource, B∈□−1Δ!B \in \Box^{-1} \Deltasource. Consequently, B∈Δ′!B \in \Delta'source. By inductive hypothesis, MΣ⊩B[Δ′]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!B}[\Delta']source. Since Δ′\Delta'source is arbitrary with RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source, for all Δ′∈WΣ\Delta' \in W^\Sigmasource such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source, MΣ⊩B[Δ′]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!B}[\Delta']source. By the definition of truth at a world in a modal model, MΣ⊩□B[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{\Box !B}[\Delta]source.

  8. Case: A≡◇B!A \ident \Diamond !Bsource

    Exercise.

Exercise completing Truth Lemma cases

probFalse,probTrue,probNot,proband,probOr,probIf,probIff,probBox,probDiamond Complete the proof of the Truth Lemma.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/completeness-K.tex

Determination and Completeness for LogK

We are now prepared to use the canonical model to establish completeness. Completeness follows from the fact that the formulas true in the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource are exactly the Σ\Sigmasource-derivable ones. Models with this property are said to determine Σ\Sigmasource.

Definition of determination by a model

A model M\mModel{M}source determines a normal modal logic Σ\Sigmasource precisely when M⊩A\mSat{M}{!A}source if and only if Σ⊢A\Sigma \Proves !Asource, for all formulas A!Asource.

Determination by the canonical model

[Determination] MΣ⊩A\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}source if and only if Σ⊢A\Sigma \Proves !Asource.

Proof

If MΣ⊩A\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}source, then for every complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource, we have MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source. Hence, by the Truth Lemma, A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource for every complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource, whence by the complete-consistent-set characterization of provability (with Γ=∅\Gamma = \emptysetsource), Σ⊢A\Sigma \Proves !Asource.

Conversely, if Σ⊢A\Sigma \Proves !Asource then by the proposition listing properties of complete Sigma consistent setsthe deductive closure clause for complete Sigma consistent sets, every complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent Δ\Deltasource contains A!Asource, and hence by the Truth Lemma, MΣ⊩A[Δ]\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}[\Delta]source for every Δ∈WΣ\Delta \in W^\Sigmasource, i.e., MΣ⊩A\mSat{M^\Sigma}{!A}source.

Since the canonical model for LogK determines LogK, we immediately have completeness of LogK as a corollary:

Completeness of basic modal logic K

The basic modal logic LogK is complete with respect to the class of all models, i.e., if ⊨A\Entails !Asource then K⊢A\Log{K} \Proves !Asource.

Proof

Contrapositively, if K⊬A\Log{K} \Proves/ !Asource then by Determination MK⊮A\mSat/{M^{\Log{K}}}{!A}source and hence A!Asource is not valid.

For the general case of completeness of a system Σ\Sigmasource with respect to a class of models, e.g., of LogKTB4 with respect to the class of reflexive, symmetric, transitive models, determination alone is not enough. We must also show that the canonical model for the system Σ\Sigmasource is a member of the class, which does not follow obviously from the canonical model construction---nor is it always true!

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/completeness/frame-completeness.tex

Frame Completeness

The completeness theorem for LogK can be extended to other modal systems, once we show that the canonical model for a given logic has the corresponding frame property.

Canonical correspondence theorem

If a normal modal logic Σ\Sigmasource contains one of the formulas on the left-hand side of the table of basic modal correspondence facts, then the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource has the corresponding property on the right-hand side.

Basic correspondence facts table

[htp] centering

Basic correspondence facts rows

Correspondence table. Column headers: if Sigma contains the axiom schema; the canonical model for Sigma has the stated property. Row one, axiom D, necessarily formula A implies possibly formula A; property serial. Row two, axiom T, necessarily formula A implies formula A; property reflexive. Row three, axiom B, formula A implies necessarily possibly formula A; property symmetric. Row four, axiom four, necessarily formula A implies necessarily necessarily formula A; property transitive. Row five, axiom five, possibly formula A implies necessarily possibly formula A; property euclidean. End table.

Σ\SigmasourceΣ\Sigmasource
Basic correspondence facts rows
axiom schema contained in Sigmacanonical-model property
D\Ax{D}source□A→◇A\Box!A \lif \Diamond !Asourceserial
T\Ax{T}source□A→A\Box!A \lif !Asourcereflexive
B\Ax{B}sourceA→□◇A!A \lif \Box\Diamond!Asourcesymmetric
4\Ax{4}source□A→□□A\Box!A \lif \Box\Box!Asourcetransitive
5\Ax{5}source◇A→□◇A\Diamond !A \lif \Box\Diamond!Asourceeuclidean
source 26

captionBasic correspondence facts.

Proof

We take each of these up in turn.

Suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains AxD, and let Δ∈WΣ\Delta \in W^\Sigmasource; we need to show that there is a Δ′\Delta'source such that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source. It suffices to show that □−1Δ\Box^{-1}\Deltasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, for then by Lindenbaum's Lemma, there is a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ′⊇□−1Δ\Delta' \supseteq \Box^{-1}\Deltasource, and by definition of RΣR^\Sigmasource we have RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source. So, suppose for contradiction that □−1Δ\Box^{-1}\Deltasource is not Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, i.e., □−1Δ⊢Σ⊥\Box^{-1}\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource. By the lemma deriving a boxed conclusion from inverse-box premises, Δ⊢Σ□⊥\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \Box\lfalsesource, and since Σ\Sigmasource contains AxD, also Δ⊢Σ◇⊥\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \Diamond\lfalsesource. But Σ\Sigmasource is normal, so Σ⊢¬◇⊥\Sigma \Proves \lnot\Diamond \lfalsesource (the normal-modal theorem that falsity is not possible), whence also Δ⊢Σ¬◇⊥\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] \lnot\Diamond \lfalsesource, against the consistency of Δ\Deltasource.

Now suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains AxT, and let Δ∈WΣ\Delta \in W^\Sigmasource. We want to show RΣΔΔR^\Sigma \Delta\Deltasource, i.e., □−1Δ⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Delta \subseteq \Deltasource. But if □A∈Δ\Box!A \in \Deltasource then by AxT also A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource, as desired.

Now suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains AxB, and suppose RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source for Δ\Deltasource, Δ′∈WΣ\Delta' \in W^\Sigmasource. We need to show that RΣΔ′ΔR^\Sigma \Delta'\Deltasource, i.e., □−1Δ′⊆Δ\Box^{-1}\Delta' \subseteq \Deltasource. By the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, this is equivalent to ◇Δ⊆Δ′\Diamond\Delta \subseteq \Delta'source. So suppose A∈Δ!A \in \Deltasource. By AxB, also □◇A∈Δ\Box\Diamond!A \in \Deltasource. By the hypothesis that RΣΔΔ′R^\Sigma \Delta\Delta'source , we have that □−1Δ⊆Δ′\Box^{-1}\Delta \subseteq \Delta'source, and hence ◇A∈Δ′\Diamond!A \in \Delta'source, as required.

Now suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains Ax4, and suppose RΣΔ1Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2source and RΣΔ2Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_2\Delta_3source. We need to show RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source. From the hypothesis we have both □−1Δ1⊆Δ2\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_2source and □−1Δ2⊆Δ3\Box^{-1}\Delta_2 \subseteq \Delta_3source. In order to show RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source it suffices to show □−1Δ1⊆Δ3\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_3source. So let B∈□−1Δ1!B \in \Box^{-1}\Delta_1source, i.e., □B∈Δ1\Box!B \in \Delta_1source. By Ax4, also □□B∈Δ1\Box\Box!B \in \Delta_1source and by hypothesis we get, first, that □B∈Δ2\Box!B \in \Delta_2source and, second, that B∈Δ3!B \in \Delta_3source, as desired.

Now suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains Ax5, suppose RΣΔ1Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2source and RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source. We need to show RΣΔ2Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_2\Delta_3source. The first hypothesis gives □−1Δ1⊆Δ2\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_2source , and the second hypothesis is equivalent to ◇Δ3⊆Δ1\Diamond\Delta_3 \subseteq \Delta_1source , by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions . To show RΣΔ2Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_2\Delta_3source , by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions, it suffices to show ◇Δ3⊆Δ2\Diamond\Delta_3 \subseteq \Delta_2source. So let ◇A∈◇Δ3\Diamond!A \in \Diamond\Delta_3source, i.e., A∈Δ3!A \in \Delta_3source. By the second hypothesis ◇A∈Δ1\Diamond!A \in \Delta_1source and by Ax5, □◇A∈Δ1\Box\Diamond!A \in \Delta_1source as well. But now the first hypothesis gives ◇A∈Δ2\Diamond!A \in \Delta_2source, as desired.

As a corollary we obtain completeness results for a number of systems. For instance, we know that S5=KT5=KTB4\Log{S5} = \Log{KT5} = \Log{KTB4}source is complete with respect to the class of all reflexive euclidean models, which is the same as the class of all reflexive, symmetric and transitive models.

Determination by intersected model classes

Let CD\mClass{C}_\Ax{D}source, CT\mClass{C}_\Ax{T}source, CB\mClass{C}_\Ax{B}source, C4\mClass{C}_\Ax{4}source, and C5\mClass{C}_\Ax{5}source be the class of all serial, reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and euclidean models (respectively). Then for any schemas A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource among AxD, AxT, AxB, Ax4, and Ax5, the system KA1…An\Log{K}!A_1 \dots !A_nsource is determined by the class of models C=CA1∩…∩CAn\mClass{C} = \mClass{C}_{!A_1} \cap \dots \cap \mClass{C}_{!A_n}source.

Additional canonical-frame correspondences

Let Σ\Sigmasource be a normal modal logic; then:

  1. If Σ\Sigmasource contains the schema ◇A→□A\Diamond!A \lif \Box !Asource then the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource is partially functional.

  2. If Σ\Sigmasource contains the schema ◇A↔□A\Diamond!A \liff \Box !Asource then the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource is functional.

  3. If Σ\Sigmasource contains the schema □□A→□A\Box\Box!A \lif \Box !Asource then the canonical model for Σ\Sigmasource is weakly dense.

(see the table of additional frame correspondences for definitions of these frame properties).

Proof

  1. Suppose that Σ\Sigmasource contains the schema ◇A→□A\Diamond !A \lif \Box !Asource, to show that RΣR^\Sigmasource is partially functional we need to prove that for any Δ1\Delta_1source, Δ2\Delta_2source, Δ3∈WΣ\Delta_3 \in W^\Sigmasource, if RΣΔ1Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2source and RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source then Δ2=Δ3\Delta_2=\Delta_3source. Since RΣΔ1Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2source we have □−1Δ1⊆Δ2\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_2source and since RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source also □−1Δ1⊆Δ3\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_3source . The identity Δ2=Δ3\Delta_2=\Delta_3source will follow if we can establish the two inclusions Δ2⊆Δ3\Delta_2 \subseteq \Delta_3source and Δ3⊆Δ2\Delta_3 \subseteq \Delta_2source. For the first inclusion, let A∈Δ2!A \in \Delta_2source; then ◇A∈Δ1\Diamond!A \in \Delta_1source, and by the schema and deductive closure of Δ1\Delta_1source also □A∈Δ1\Box!A \in \Delta_1source, whence by the hypothesis that RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source, A∈Δ3!A \in \Delta_3source. The second inclusion is similar.

  2. This follows immediately from part the first additional canonical-frame property and the seriality proof in the canonical-frame correspondence theorem.

  3. Suppose Σ\Sigmasource contains the schema □□A→□A\Box\Box!A \lif \Box!Asource and to show that RΣR^\Sigmasource is weakly dense, let RΣΔ1Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2source. We need to show that there is a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ3\Delta_3source such that RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source and RΣΔ3Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_3\Delta_2source. Let:

    Γ=□−1Δ1∪◇Δ2.\Gamma = \Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \cup \Diamond\Delta_2.source

    It suffices to show that Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, for then by Lindenbaum's Lemma it can be extended to a complete Σ\Sigmasource-consistent set Δ3\Delta_3source such that □−1Δ1⊆Δ3\Box^{-1}\Delta_1 \subseteq \Delta_3source and ◇Δ2⊆Δ3\Diamond\Delta_2 \subseteq \Delta_3source, i.e., RΣΔ1Δ3R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_3source and RΣΔ3Δ2R^\Sigma \Delta_3\Delta_2source (by the equivalence between the inverse-box and diamond accessibility conditions) .

    Suppose for contradiction that Γ\Gammasource is not consistent. Then there are formulas □A1\Box!A_1source, dots, □An∈Δ1\Box!A_n \in \Delta_1source and B1!B_1source, dots, Bm∈Δ2!B_m \in \Delta_2source such that

    A1,…,An,◇B1,…,◇Bm⊢Σ⊥.!A_1, \dots, !A_n, \Diamond!B_1, \dots, \Diamond!B_m \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalse.source

    Since ◇(B1∧…∧Bm)→(◇B1∧…∧◇Bm)\Diamond (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m) \to (\Diamond!B_1 \land \dots \land \Diamond!B_m)source is derivable in every normal modal logic, we argue as follows, contradicting the consistency of Δ2\Delta_2source:

    A1,…,An,◇B1,…,◇Bm⊢Σ⊥A1,…,An⊢Σ(◇B1∧…∧◇Bm)→⊥by the deduction theoremthe proposition on derivability factsthe deduction-theorem clause of the derivability facts, and tautA1,…,An⊢Σ◇(B1∧…∧Bm)→⊥since Σ is normalA1,…,An⊢Σ¬◇(B1∧…∧Bm)by plA1,…,An⊢Σ□¬(B1∧…∧Bm)□¬ for ¬◇□A1,…,□An⊢Σ□□¬(B1∧…∧Bm)by the lemma lifting a derivation into boxed premises and conclusion□A1,…,□An⊢Σ□¬(B1∧…∧Bm)by schema □□A→□AΔ1⊢Σ□¬(B1∧…∧Bm)by monotonicity, the proposition on derivability factsthe monotonicity clause of the derivability facts□¬(B1∧…∧Bm)∈Δ1by deductive closure;¬(B1∧…∧Bm)∈Δ2since RΣΔ1Δ2.!A_1, \dots, !A_n, & \Diamond!B_1, \dots, \Diamond!B_m \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalse \\ !A_1, \dots,!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] (\Diamond!B_1 \land \dots \land \Diamond!B_m) \lif \lfalse\\ & \qquad\text{by the deduction theorem}\\ & \qquad\text{\olref[prf][prp]{prop:derivabilityfacts}\olref[prf][prp]{prop:derivabilityfacts-deduction}, and \Taut} \\ !A_1, \dots,!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] \Diamond(!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m) \lif \lfalse\\ & \qquad \text{since $\Sigma$ is normal} \\ !A_1, \dots,!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] \lnot\Diamond (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m)\\ & \qquad\text{by \PL} \\ !A_1, \dots,!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] \Box\lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m)\\ & \qquad\text{$\Box\lnot$ for $\lnot\Diamond$} \\ \Box!A_1, \dots,\Box!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] \Box\Box \lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m)\\ & \qquad\text{by \olref[mod]{lem:box1}} \\ \Box!A_1, \dots,\Box!A_n & \Proves[\Sigma] \Box\lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m)\\ &\qquad\text{by schema $\Box\Box!A \lif \Box!A$} \\ \Delta_1 & \Proves[\Sigma] \Box\lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m)\\ &\qquad\text{by monotonicity, \olref[prf][prp]{prop:derivabilityfacts}\olref[prf][prp]{prop:derivabilityfacts-monotonicity}} \\ & \Box\lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m) \in \Delta_1\\ &\qquad\text{by deductive closure}; \\ & \lnot (!B_1 \land \dots \land !B_m) \in \Delta_2\\ &\qquad \text{since } R^\Sigma \Delta_1\Delta_2.source

On the strength of these examples, one might think that every system Σ\Sigmasource of modal logic is complete, in the sense that it proves every formula which is valid in every frame in which every theorem of Σ\Sigmasource is valid. Unfortunately, there are many systems that are not complete in this sense.

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