Normal Modal Logics

Syntax and Semantics

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Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/syntax-and-semantics.tex

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/introduction.tex

Introduction

Modal logic deals with modal propositions and the entailment relations among them. Examples of modal propositions are the following:

  1. It is necessary that 2+2=42+2=4source.

  2. It is necessarily possible that it will rain tomorrow.

  3. If it is necessarily possible that A!Asource then it is possible that A!Asource.

Possibility and necessity are not the only modalities: other unary connectives are also classified as modalities, for instance, “it ought to be the case that A!Asource,” “It will be the case that A!Asource,” “Dana knows that A!Asource,” or “Dana believes that A!Asource.”

Modal logic makes its first appearance in Aristotle's De Interpretatione: he was the first to notice that necessity implies possibility, but not vice versa; that possibility and necessity are inter-definable; that If AB!A \land !Bsource is possibly true then A!Asource is possibly true and B!Bsource is possibly true, but not conversely; and that if AB!A \to !Bsource is necessary, then if A!Asource is necessary, so is B!Bsource.

The first modern approach to modal logic was the work of C. I. Lewis, culminating with Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic (1932). Lewis & Langford were unhappy with the representation of implication by means of the material conditional: AB!A \lif !Bsource is a poor substitute for “A!Asource implies B!Bsource.” Instead, they proposed to characterize implication as “Necessarily, if A!Asource then B!Bsource,” symbolized as AB!A \strictif !Bsource. In trying to sort out the different properties, Lewis identified five different modal systems, LogS1, ldots, LogS4, LogS5, the last two of which are still in use.

The approach of Lewis and Langford was purely syntactical: they identified reasonable axioms and rules and investigated what was provable with those means. A semantic approach remained elusive for a long time, until a first attempt was made by Rudolf Carnap in Meaning and Necessity (1947) using the notion of a state description, i.e., a collection of atomic sentences (those that are “true” in that state description). After lifting the truth definition to arbitrary sentences A!Asource, Carnap defines A!Asource to be necessarily true if it is true in all state descriptions. Carnap's approach could not handle iterated modalities, in that sentences of the form “Possibly necessarily ldots possibly A!Asource” always reduce to the innermost modality.

The major breakthrough in modal semantics came with Saul Kripke's article “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic” (JSL 1959). Kripke based his work on Leibniz's idea that a statement is necessarily true if it is true “at all possible worlds.” This idea, though, suffers from the same drawbacks as Carnap's, in that the truth of statement at a world wwsource (or a state description sssource) does not depend on wwsource at all. So Kripke assumed that worlds are related by an accessibility relation RRsource, and that a statement of the form “Necessarily A!Asource” is true at a world wwsource if and only if A!Asource is true at all worlds ww'source accessible from wwsource. Semantics that provide some version of this approach are called Kripke semantics and made possible the tumultuous development of modal logics (in the plural).

When interpreted by the Kripke semantics, modal logic shows us what relational structures look like “from the inside.” A relational structure is just a set equipped with a binary relation (for instance, the set of students in the class ordered by their social security number is a relational structure). But in fact relational structures come in all sorts of domains: besides relative possibility of states of the world, we can have epistemic states of some agent related by epistemic possibility, or states of a dynamical system with their state transitions, etc. Modal logic can be used to model all of these: the first gives us ordinary, alethic, modal logic; the others give us epistemic logic, dynamic logic, etc.

We focus on one particular angle, known to modal logicians as “correspondence theory.” One of the most significant early discoveries of Kripke's is that many properties of the accessibility relation RRsource (whether it is transitive, symmetric, etc.) can be characterized in the modal language itself by means of appropriate “modal schemas.” Modal logicians say, for instance, that the reflexivity of RRsource “corresponds” to the schema “If necessarily A!Asource, then A!Asource”. We explore mainly the correspondence theory of a number of classical systems of modal logic (e.g., LogS4 and LogS5) obtained by a combination of the schemas AxD, AxT, AxB, Ax4, and Ax5.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/language-modal-logic.tex

The Language of Basic Modal Logic

Primitive symbols of the basic modal language

The basic language of modal logic contains

  1. The propositional constant for falsity \lfalsesource.

  2. A denumerables set of propositional variables: p0\Obj p_0source, p1\Obj p_1source, p2\Obj p_2source, dots

  3. The propositional connectives: ¬\lnotsource (negation) , \landsource (conjunction) , \lorsource (disjunction) , \lifsource (conditional) .

  4. The modal operator \Boxsource.

  5. The modal operator \Diamondsource.

Inductive definition of basic modal formulas

Formulas of the basic modal language are inductively defined as follows:

  1. \lfalsesource is an atomic formula.

  2. Every propositional variable pi\Obj p_isource is an (atomic) formula.

  3. If A!Asource is a formula, then ¬A\lnot !Asource is a formula.

  4. If A!Asource and B!Bsource are formulas, then (AB)(!A \land !B)source is a formula.

  5. If A!Asource and B!Bsource are formulas, then (AB)(!A \lor !B)source is a formula.

  6. If A!Asource and B!Bsource are formulas, then (AB)(!A \lif !B)source is a formula.

  7. If A!Asource is a formula, then A\Box !Asource is a formula.

  8. If A!Asource is a formula, then A\Diamond !Asource is a formula.

  9. Nothing else is a formula.

Projected abbreviations for defined modal operators

Formulas constructed using the defined operators are to be understood as follows:

Tagenumerate

defTrue,defFalse,defNot,defOr,defAnd,defIf,defIff,defBox,defDiamond

item \ltruesource abbreviates ¬\lnot\lfalsesource .

item AB!A \liff !Bsource abbreviates (AB)(BA)(!A \lif !B) \land (!B \lif !A)source.

If a formula A!Asource does not contain \Boxsource or \Diamondsource, we say it is modal-free.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/substitution.tex

Simultaneous Substitution

An instance of a formula A!Asource is the result of replacing all occurrences of a propositional variable in A!Asource by some other formula. We will refer to instances of formulas often, both when discussing validity and when discussing derivability. It therefore is useful to define the notion precisely.

Definition of simultaneous substitution

Where A!Asource is a modal formula all of whose propositional variables are among p1p_1source, dots, pnp_nsource, and D1!D_1source, dots, Dn!D_nsource are also modal formulas, we define A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source as the result of simultaneously substituting each Di!D_isource for pip_isource in A!Asource. Formally, this is a definition by induction on A!Asource:

  1. Case: A!A \ident \lfalsesource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is \lfalsesource.

  2. Case: Aq!A \ident qsource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is qqsource, provided qpiq \not\ident p_isource for i=1i = 1source, dots, nnsource.

  3. Case: Api!A \ident p_isource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is Di!D_isource.

  4. Case: A¬B!A \ident \lnot !Bsource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is ¬B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\lnot \SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source.

  5. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \land !C)source

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is

    (B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]C[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]).(\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \land \SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}).source
  6. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lor !C)source

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is

    (B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]C[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]).(\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \lor \SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}).source
  7. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lif !C)source

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is

    (B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]C[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]).(\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \lif \SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}).source
  8. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \liff !C)source

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is

    (B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]C[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]).(\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \liff \SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}).source
  9. Case: AB!A \ident \Box !Bsource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn].\Box \SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}.source

  10. Case: AB!A \ident \Diamond !Bsource

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{\indfrm}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn].\Diamond \SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}.source

The formula A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is called a substitution instance of A!Asource.

Example contrasting simultaneous and iterated substitution

Suppose A!Asource is p1(p1p2)p_1 \lif \Box(p_1 \land p_2)source, D1!D_1source is (p2p3)\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3)source and D2!D_2source is ¬p1\lnot\Box p_1source. Then A[D1/p1,D2/p2]\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \subst{!D_2}{p_2}}source is

(p2p3)((p2p3)¬p1)while A[D2/p1,D1/p2] is¬p1(¬p1(p2p3))Note that simultaneous substitution is in general not the same as iterated substitution, e.g., compare A[D1/p1,D2/p2] above with (A[D1/p1])[D2/p2], which is:(p2p3)((p2p3)p2)[¬p1/p2], i.e.,(¬p1p3)((¬p1p3)¬p1)and with (A[D2/p2])[D1/p1]:p1(p1¬p1)[(p2p3)/p1], i.e.,(p2p3)((p2p3)¬(p2p3)).\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) & \lif \Box(\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) \land \lnot\Box p_1) \intertext{while $\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_2}{p_1}, \subst{!D_1}{p_2}}$ is} \lnot\Box p_1 & \lif \Box(\lnot\Box p_1 \land \Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3)) \intertext{Note that simultaneous substitution is in general not the same as iterated substitution, e.g., compare $\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \subst{!D_2}{p_2}}$ above with $\Subst{(\Subst{!A}{!D_1}{p_1})}{!D_2}{p_2}$, which is:} \Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) & \Subst{\lif \Box(\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) \land p_2)}{\lnot\Box p_1}{p_2}, \text{ i.e.,}\\ \Diamond(\lnot\Box p_1 \lif p_3) & \lif \Box(\Diamond(\lnot\Box p_1 \lif p_3) \land \lnot\Box p_1)\\ \intertext{and with $\Subst{(\Subst{!A}{!D_2}{p_2})}{!D_1}{p_1}$:} p_1 & \lif \Subst{\Box(p_1 \land \lnot\Box p_1)}{\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3)}{p_1}, \text{ i.e.,}\\ \Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) & \lif \Box(\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3) \land \lnot\Box\Diamond(p_2 \lif p_3)).source

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/relational-models.tex

Relational Models

The basic concept of semantics for normal modal logics is that of a relational model. It consists of a set of worlds, which are related by a binary “accessibility relation,” together with an assignment which determines which propositional variables count as “true” at which worlds.

Definition of a relational modal model

A model for the basic modal language is a triple M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source, where

  1. WWsource is a nonempty set of “worlds,”

  2. RRsource is a binary accessibility relation on WWsource, and

  3. VVsource is a function assigning to each propositional variable ppsource a set V(p)V(p)source of possible worlds.

When RwwRww'source holds, we say that ww'source is accessible from wwsource. When wV(p)w \in V(p)source we say ppsource is true at wwsource.

The great advantage of relational semantics is that models can be represented by means of simple diagrams, such as the one in the simple three-world model figure. Worlds are represented by nodes, and world ww'source is accessible from wwsource precisely when there is an arrow from wwsource to ww'source. Moreover, we label a node (world) by p\mTrue{p}source when wV(p)w \in V(p)source, and otherwise by ¬p\mFalse{p}source. the simple three-world model figure represents the model with W={w1,w2,w3}W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}source, R={w1,w2,w1,w3}R = \{\tuple{w_1, w_2},\tuple{w_1, w_3}\}source, V(p)={w1,w2}V(p) = \{w_1, w_2\}source, and V(q)={w2}V(q) = \{w_2\}source.

Figure containing the simple three-world model

The figure contains the source model graph with worlds w one, w two, and w three, printed truth labels for p and q at every world, and exactly two arrows, both from w one. Its inner TikZ object supplies the ordered structural reading.

Source transcription

Simple three-world relational model

Model graph. Node one is w subscript one. Its printed valuations are, in source order, p is true and q is false. Node two is w subscript two. Its printed valuations are p is true and q is true. Node three is w subscript three. Its printed valuations are p is false and q is false. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: from w subscript one to w subscript two; then from w subscript one to w subscript three. No loop or further edge is printed. End model graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: w subscript onep\mTrue{p}source¬q\mFalse{q}sourcew1w_1source
  2. Node 2: w subscript twop\mTrue{p}sourceq\mTrue{q}sourcew2w_2source
  3. Node 3: w subscript three¬p\mFalse{p}source¬q\mFalse{q}sourcew3w_3source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
  2. Edge 2: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
source 43

captionA simple model.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/truth-at-w.tex

Truth at a World

Every modal model determines which modal formulas count as true at which worlds in it. The relation “model M\mModel{M}source makes formula A!Asource true at world wwsource” is the basic notion of relational semantics. The relation is defined inductively and coincides with the usual characterization using truth tables for the non-modal operators.

Inductive definition of truth at a world

Truth of a formula A!Asource at wwsource in a M\mModel Msource, in symbols: MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w]source, is defined inductively as follows:

  1. Case: A!A \ident \lfalsesource

    Never M[w]\mSat{M}{\lfalse}[w]source.

  2. Mp[w]\mSat{M}{p}[w]source iff wV(p)w \in V(p)source.

  3. Case: A¬B!A \ident \lnot !Bsource

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat/{M}{!B}[w]source.

  4. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \land !C)source

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source and MC[w]\mSat{M}{!C}[w]source.

  5. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lor !C)source

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source or MC[w]\mSat{M}{!C}[w]source (or both).

  6. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lif !C)source

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat/{M}{!B}[w]source or MC[w]\mSat{M}{!C}[w]source.

  7. Case: AB!A \ident \Box !Bsource

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w']source for all wWw' \in Wsource with RwwRww'source.

  8. Case: AB!A \ident \Diamond !Bsource

    MA[w]\mSat{M}{\indfrm}[w]source iff MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w']source for at least one wWw' \in Wsource with RwwRww'source.

Note that by clause the necessity clause in the definition of truth at a world, a formula B\Box !Bsource is true at wwsource whenever there are no ww'source with RwwRww'source. In such a case B\Box !Bsource is vacuously true at wwsource. Also, B\Box !Bsource may be satisfied at wwsource even if B!Bsource is not. The truth of B!Bsource at wwsource does not guarantee the truth of B\Diamond !Bsource at wwsource. This holds, however, if RwwRwwsource, e.g., if RRsource is reflexive. If there is no ww'source such that RwwRww'source, then MA[w]\mSat/{M}{\Diamond !A}[w]source, for any A!Asource.

Exercise evaluating nine formulas in the simple model

Consider the model of the simple three-world model figure. Which of the following hold?

  1. Mq[w1]\mSat{M}{q}[w_1]source;

  2. M¬q[w3]\mSat{M}{\lnot q}[w_3]source;

  3. Mpq[w1]\mSat{M}{p \lor q}[w_1]source;

  4. M(pq)[w1]\mSat{M}{\Box (p \lor q)}[w_1]source;

  5. Mq[w3]\mSat{M}{\Box q}[w_3]source;

  6. M[w3]\mSat{M}{\Box \bot}[w_3]source;

  7. Mq[w1]\mSat{M}{\Diamond q}[w_1]source;

  8. Mq[w1]\mSat{M}{\Box q}[w_1]source;

  9. M¬¬q[w1]\mSat{M}{\lnot \Box\Box \lnot q}[w_1]source.

Duality of necessity and possibility

  1. MA[w]\mSat{M}{\Box !A}[w]source iff M¬¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source.

  2. MA[w]\mSat{M}{\Diamond !A}[w]source iff M¬¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot\Box\lnot !A}[w]source.

Proof

  1. M¬¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source iff M¬A[w]\mSat/{M}{\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source by definition of M[w]\mSat{M}{}[w]source. M¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source iff for some ww'source with RwwRww'source, M¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot !A}[w']source. Hence, M¬A[w]\mSat/{M}{\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source iff for all ww'source with RwwRww'source, M¬A[w]\mSat/{M}{\lnot !A}[w']source. We also have M¬A[w]\mSat/{M}{\lnot !A}[w']source iff MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w']source. Together we have M¬¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot\Diamond\lnot !A}[w]source iff for all ww'source with RwwRww'source, MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w']source. Again by definition of M[w]\mSat{M}{}[w]source, that is the case iff MA[w]\mSat{M}{\Box !A}[w]source.

  2. Exercise.

Exercise completing the modal duality proof

probDiamond Complete the proof of the proposition on duality of necessity and possibility.

Exercise on worlds with matching atoms and successors

Let M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source be a model, and suppose w1,w2Ww_1, w_2 \in Wsource are such that:

  1. w1V(p)w_1 \in V(p)source if and only if w2V(p)w_2 \in V(p)source (for every propositional variable ppsource); and

  2. for all wWw \in Wsource: Rw1wRw_1wsource if and only if Rw2wRw_2wsource.

Using induction on formulas, show that for all formulas A!Asource: MA[w1]\mSat{M}{!A}[w_1]source if and only if MA[w2]\mSat{M}{!A}[w_2]source.

Exercise on not-possible and necessary-not

prvDiamond Let M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source. Show that M¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot\Diamond !A}[w]source if and only if M¬A[w]\mSat{M}{\Box\lnot!A}[w]source.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/truth-in-model.tex

Truth in a Model

Sometimes we are interested in which formulas are true at every world in a given model. Let's introduce a notation for this.

Definition of truth throughout a model

A formula A!Asource is true in a model M=W,R,VM = \tuple{W, R, V}source, written MA\mSat{M}{!A}source, if and only if MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w]source for every wWw \in Wsource.

Two facts about truth throughout a model

  1. If MA\mSat{M}{!A}source then M¬A\mSat/{M}{\lnot !A}source, but not vice-versa.

  2. If MAB\mSat{M}{!A \lif !B}source then MA\mSat{M}{!A}source only if MB\mSat{M}{!B}source, but not vice-versa.

Proof

  1. If MA\mSat{M}{!A}source then A!Asource is true at all worlds in WWsource, and since WW \neq \emptysetsource, it can't be that M¬A\mSat{M}{\lnot!A}source, or else A!Asource would have to be both true and false at some world.

    On the other hand, if M¬A\mSat/{M}{\lnot !A}source then A!Asource is true at some world wWw \in Wsource. It does not follow that MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w]source for every wWw \in Wsource. For instance, in the model of the simple three-world model figure, M¬p\mSat/{M}{\lnot p}source, and also Mp\mSat/{M}{p}source.

  2. Assume MAB\mSat{M}{!A \lif !B}source and MA\mSat{M}{!A}source; to show MB\mSat{M}{!B}source let wWw \in Wsource be an arbitrary world. Then MAB[w]\mSat{M}{!A \lif !B}[w]source and MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w]source, so MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source, and since wwsource was arbitrary, MB\mSat{M}{!B}source.

    To show that the converse fails, we need to find a model M\mModel{M}source such that MA\mSat{M}{!A}source only if MB\mSat{M}{!B}source, but MAB\mSat/{M}{!A \lif !B}source. Consider again the model of the simple three-world model figure: Mp\mSat/{M}{p}source and hence (vacuously) Mp\mSat{M}{p}source only if Mq\mSat{M}{q}source. However, Mpq\mSat/{M}{p \lif q}source, as ppsource is true but qqsource false at w1w_1source.

Exercise evaluating formulas throughout a three-world model

Consider the following model M\mModel{M}source for the language comprising p1p_1source, p2p_2source, p3p_3source as the only propositional variables:

Three-world model for the global-truth exercise

Exercise model graph. Node one is w subscript one. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is false, and p subscript three is false. Node two is w subscript two. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is true, and p subscript three is false. Node three is w subscript three. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is true, and p subscript three is true. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: a loop at w subscript three; from w subscript one to w subscript two; from w subscript two to w subscript three; and from w subscript one to w subscript three. End exercise model graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: w subscript onep1\mTrue{p_1}source¬p2\mFalse{p_2}source¬p3\mFalse{p_3}sourcew1w_1source
  2. Node 2: w subscript twop1\mTrue{p_1}sourcep2\mTrue{p_2}source¬p3\mFalse{p_3}sourcew2w_2source
  3. Node 3: w subscript threep1\mTrue{p_1}sourcep2\mTrue{p_2}sourcep3\mTrue{p_3}sourcew3w_3source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w3 to w3; accessibility relation R; loop.
  2. Edge 2: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
  3. Edge 3: w2 to w3; accessibility relation R.
  4. Edge 4: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
source 59

Are the following formulas and schemas true in the model M\mModel{M}source, i.e., true at every world in M\mModel{M}source? Explain.

  1. ppp\lif \Diamond psource (for ppsource atomic);

  2. AA!A\lif \Diamond !Asource (for A!Asource arbitrary);

  3. pp\Box p \lif psource (for ppsource atomic);

  4. ¬pp\lnot p \lif \Diamond \Box psource (for ppsource atomic);

  5. A\Diamond \Box !Asource (for A!Asource arbitrary);

  6. p\Box \Diamond psource (for ppsource atomic).

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/modal-validity.tex

Validity

Explain

Formulas that are true in all models, i.e., true at every world in every model, are particularly interesting. They represent those modal propositions which are true regardless of how \Boxsource and \Diamondsource are interpreted, as long as the interpretation is “normal” in the sense that it is generated by some accessibility relation on possible worlds. We call such formulas valid. For instance, (pq)p\Box(p \land q) \lif \Box psource is valid. Some formulas one might expect to be valid on the basis of the alethic interpretation of \Boxsource, such as pp\Box p \lif psource, are not valid, however. Part of the interest of relational models is that different interpretations of \Boxsource and \Diamondsource can be captured by different kinds of accessibility relations. This suggests that we should define validity not just relative to all models, but relative to all models of a certain kind. It will turn out, e.g., that pp\Box p \lif psource is true in all models where every world is accessible from itself, i.e., RRsource is reflexive. Defining validity relative to classes of models enables us to formulate this succinctly: pp\Box p \lif psource is valid in the class of reflexive models.

Definition of validity relative to a class of models

A formula A!Asource is valid in a class C\mClass{C}source of models if it is true in every model in C\mClass{C}source (i.e., true at every world in every model in C\mClass{C}source). If A!Asource is valid in C\mClass{C}source, we write CA\mClass{C} \Entails !Asource, and we write A\Entails !Asource if A!Asource is valid in the class of all models.

Validity is inherited by subclasses

If A!Asource is valid in C\mClass{C}source it is also valid in each class CC\mClass{C}' \subseteq \mClass{C}source.

Validity is closed under necessitation

If A!Asource is valid, then so is A\Box!Asource.

Proof

Assume A\Entails !Asource. To show A\Entails \Box!Asource let M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source be a model and wWw \in Wsource. If RwwRww'source then MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w']source, since A!Asource is valid, and so also MA[w]\mSat{M}{\Box!A}[w]source. Since M\mModel{M}source and wwsource were arbitrary, A\Entails \Box!Asource.

Exercise proving three valid modal formulas

Show that the following are valid:

  1. p(qp)\Box p \lif \Box (q \lif p)source;

  2. ¬\Box \lnot \lfalsesource;

  3. p(qp)\Box p \lif (\Box q \lif \Box p)source.

Exercise on validity in singleton and edgeless models

Show that AA!A \lif \Box!Asource is valid in the class C\mClass{C}source of models M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source where W={w}W = \{w\}source. Similarly, show that BA!B \lif \Box !Asource and AB\Diamond !A \lif !Bsource are valid in the class of models M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source where R=R = \emptysetsource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/tautological-instances.tex

Tautological Instances

Explain

A modal-free formula is a tautology if it is true under every truth-value assignment. Clearly, every tautology is true at every world in every model. But for formulas involving \Boxsource and \Diamondsource, the notion of tautology is not defined. Is it the case, e.g., that p¬p\Box p \lor \lnot \Box psource---an instance of the principle of excluded middle---is valid? The notion of a tautological instance helps: a formula that is a substitution instance of a (non-modal) tautology. It is not surprising, but still requires proof, that every tautological instance is valid.

Definition of a tautological instance

A modal formula B!Bsource is a tautological instance if and only if there is a modal-free tautology A!Asource with propositional variables p1p_1source, dots, pnp_nsource and formulas D1!D_1source, dots, Dn!D_nsource such that BA[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]!B \ident \SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source.

Lemma transferring a modal-free valuation into a model

Suppose A!Asource is a modal-free formula whose propositional variables are p1p_1source, dots, pnp_nsource, and let D1!D_1source, dots, Dn!D_nsource be modal formulas. Then for any assignment v\pAssign{v}source, any model M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source, and any wWw \in Wsource such that v(pi)=T\pAssign{v}(p_i) = \Truesource if and only if MDi[w]\mSat{M}{!D_i}[w]source we have that vA\pSat{v}{!A}source if and only if MA[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]\mSat{M}{\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]source.

Proof

By induction on A!Asource.

  1. Case: A!A \ident \lfalsesource

    Both v\pSat/{v}{\lfalse}source and M[w]\mSat/{M}{\lfalse}[w]source.

  2. Case: Api!A \ident p_isource

    vpiv(pi)=Tby definition of vpiMDi[w]by assumptionMpi[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]since pi[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]Di.\pSat{v}{p_i} \Leftrightarrow {} & \pAssign{v}(p_i) = \True \\ & \qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{p_i}$}\\ \Leftrightarrow {} & \mSat{M}{!D_i}[w] \\ &\qquad \text{by assumption}\\ \Leftrightarrow {} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{p_i}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{since $\SSubst{p_i}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \ident !D_i$}.source
  3. Case: A¬B!A \ident \lnot !Bsource

    v¬BvBby definition of v;MB[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by induction hypothesisM¬B[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by definition of v.\pSat{v}{\lnot !B} \Leftrightarrow {} & \pSat/{v}{!B}\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{}$};\\ \Leftrightarrow {} & \mSat/{M}{\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by induction hypothesis}\\ \Leftrightarrow {} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{\lnot !B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{}$}.source
  4. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \land !C)source

    vBCvB and vCby definition of vMB[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w] and MC[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by induction hypothesisM(BC)[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by definition of M[w].\pSat{v}{!B \land !C} \Leftrightarrow {} & \pSat{v}{!B} \text{ and } \pSat{v}{!C}\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{}$}\\ \Leftrightarrow {} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w] \text{ and } \\ & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by induction hypothesis}\\ \Leftrightarrow{} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{(!B \land !C)}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\mSat{M}{}[w]$}.source
  5. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lor !C)source

    vBCvB or vCby definition of v;MB[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w] or MC[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by induction hypothesisM(BC)[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by definition of M[w].\pSat{v}{!B \lor !C} \Leftrightarrow{} & \pSat{v}{!B} \text{ or } \pSat{v}{!C}\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{}$};\\ \Leftrightarrow{} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w] \text{ or }\\ & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by induction hypothesis}\\ \Leftrightarrow{} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{(!B \lor !C)}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\mSat{M}{}[w]$}.source
  6. Case: A(BC)!A \ident (!B \lif !C)source

    vBCvB or vCby definition of vMB[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w] or MC[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by induction hypothesisM(BC)[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]by definition of M[w].\pSat{v}{!B \lif !C} \Leftrightarrow{} & \pSat/{v}{!B} \text{ or } \pSat{v}{!C}\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\pSat{v}{}$}\\ \Leftrightarrow{} & \mSat/{M}{\SSubst{!B}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w] \text{ or }\\ & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by induction hypothesis}\\ \Leftrightarrow{} & \mSat{M}{\SSubst{(!B \lif !C)}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]\\ &\qquad \text{by definition of $\mSat{M}{}[w]$}.source

Every tautological instance is valid

All tautological instances are valid.

Proof

Contrapositively, suppose A!Asource is such that MA[D1/p1,,Dn/pn][w]\mSat/{M}{\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}}}[w]source, for some model M\mModel{M}source and world wwsource. Define an assignment v\pAssign{v}source such that v(pi)=T\pAssign{v}(p_i) = \Truesource if and only if MDi[w]\mSat{M}{!D_i}[w]source (and v\pAssign{v}source assigns arbitrary values to q{p1,,pn}q \notin \{p_1, \dots, p_n \}source). Then by the lemma transferring modal-free satisfaction to a substitution instance, vA\pSat/{v}{!A}source, so A!Asource is not a tautology.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/schemas.tex

Schemas and Validity

Definition of a modal schema

A schema is a set of formulas comprising all and only the substitution instances of some modal formula C!Csource, i.e.,

{B:D1,,Dn(B=C[D1/p1,,Dn/pn])}.\Setabs{!B}{\lexists[!D_1], \dots, \lexists[!D_n] \left(!B = \SSubst{!C}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \right) }.source

The formula C!Csource is called the characteristic formula of the schema, and it is unique up to a renaming of the propositional variables. A formula A!Asource is an instance of a schema if it is a member of the set.

It is convenient to denote a schema by the meta-linguistic expression obtained by substituting `A!Asource', `B!Bsource', dots, for the atomic components of C!Csource. So, for instance, the following denote schemas: `A!Asource', `AA!A \lif \Box!Asource', `A(BA)!A \lif (!B \lif !A)source'. They correspond to the characteristic formulas ppsource, ppp \lif \Box psource, p(qp)p \lif (q \lif p)source. The schema `A!Asource' denotes the set of all formulas.

Truth and validity of a schema

A schema is true in a model if and only if all of its instances are; and a schema is valid if and only if it is true in every model.

Validity of the K schema

The following schema AxK is valid

(AB)(AB).row label K\Box(!A \lif !B) \lif (\Box !A \lif \Box !B). \tag{\Ax{K}}source

Proof

We need to show that all instances of the schema are true at every world in every model. So let M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W,R,V}source and wWw \in Wsource be arbitrary. To show that a conditional is true at a world we assume the antecedent is true to show that the consequent is true as well. In this case, let M(AB)[w]\mSat{M}{\Box(!A \lif !B)}[w]source and MA[w]\mSat{M}{\Box !A}[w]source. We need to show MB[w]\mSat{M}{\Box !B}[w]source. So let ww'source be arbitrary such that RwwRww'source. Then by the first assumption MAB[w]\mSat{M}{!A \lif !B}[w']source and by the second assumption MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w']source. It follows that MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w']source. Since ww'source was arbitrary, MB[w]\mSat{M}{\Box !B}[w]source.

Validity of the Dual schema

The following schema Dual is valid

A¬¬A.row label dual\Diamond !A \liff \lnot\Box\lnot !A. \tag{\Dual}source

Proof

Exercise.

Exercise proving the Dual schema

Prove the proposition that the Dual schema is valid.

Semantic modus ponens

If A!Asource and AB!A \lif !Bsource are true at a world in a model then so is B!Bsource. Hence, the valid formulas are closed under modus ponens.

Validity is equivalent to validity of every substitution instance

A formula A!Asource is valid iff all its substitution instances are. In other words, a schema is valid iff its characteristic formula is.

Proof

The “if” direction is obvious, since A!Asource is a substitution instance of itself.

To prove the “only if” direction, we show the following: Suppose M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source is a modal model, and BA[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]!B \ident \SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1},\dots,\subst{!D_n}{p_n}}source is a substitution instance of A!Asource. Define M=W,R,V\mModel{M'} = \tuple{W, R, V'}source by V(pi)={w:MDi[w]}V'(p_i) = \Setabs{w}{\mSat{M}{!D_i}[w]}source. Then MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source iff MA[w]\mSat{M'}{!A}[w]source, for any wWw \in Wsource. (We leave the proof as an exercise.) Now suppose that A!Asource was valid, but some substitution instance B!Bsource of A!Asource was not valid. Then for some M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source and some wWw \in Wsource, MB[w]\mSat/{M}{!B}[w]source. But then MA[w]\mSat/{M'}{!A}[w]source by the claim, and A!Asource is not valid, a contradiction.

Exercise proving the substitution-model claim

Prove the claim in the “only if” part of the proof of the proposition equating validity with validity of every substitution instance. (Hint: use induction on A!Asource.)

Note, however, that it is not true that a schema is true in a model iff its characteristic formula is. Of course, the “only if” direction holds: if every instance of A!Asource is true in M\mModel{M}source, A!Asource itself is true in M\mModel{M}source. But it may happen that A!Asource is true in M\mModel{M}source but some instance of A!Asource is false at some world in M\mModel{M}source. For a very simple counterexample consider ppsource in a model with only one world wwsource and V(p)={w}V(p) = \{w\}source, so that ppsource is true at wwsource. But \lfalsesource is an instance of ppsource, and not true at wwsource.

Exercise showing five familiar modal schemas are not generally valid

Show that none of the following formulas are valid:

  1. quad pp\Box p \lif \Diamond psource;

  2. quad pp\Box p \lif psource;

  3. quad ppp \lif \Box\Diamond psource;

  4. quad pp\Box p \lif \Box \Box psource;

  5. quad pp\Diamond p \lif \Box \Diamond psource.

Outer table of valid and invalid modal schemas

[t] centering

Six paired valid and invalid modal schemas

Two-column schema table. Headers: Valid Schemas; Invalid Schemas. Row one: valid schema if the conditional from A to B is necessary, then if A is possible, B is possible; invalid schema if the disjunction of A and B is necessary, then either A is necessary or B is necessary. Row two: valid schema if the conditional from A to B is possible, then if A is necessary, B is possible; invalid schema if A is possible and B is possible, then the conjunction of A and B is possible. Row three: valid schema the conjunction of A and B is necessary if and only if both A and B are necessary; invalid schema if A, then necessarily A. Row four: valid schema if A is necessary, then the conditional from B to A is necessary; invalid schema if necessarily possibly A, then B. Row five: valid schema if A is not possible, then the conditional from A to B is necessary; invalid schema if necessarily necessarily A, then necessarily A. Row six: valid schema the disjunction of A and B is possible if and only if either A is possible or B is possible; invalid schema if necessarily possibly A, then possibly necessarily A. End schema table.

Six paired valid and invalid modal schemas
Valid SchemasInvalid Schemas
(AB)(AB)\Box(!A \lif !B) \lif (\Diamond !A \lif \Diamond !B)source(AB)(AB)\Box (!A \lor !B) \lif (\Box !A \lor \Box !B)source
(AB)(AB)\Diamond (!A \lif !B) \lif (\Box !A \lif \Diamond !B)source(AB)(AB)(\Diamond !A \land \Diamond !B) \lif \Diamond (!A \land !B)source
(AB)(AB)\Box (!A \land !B) \liff (\Box !A \land \Box !B)sourceAA!A \lif \Box !Asource
A(BA)\Box !A \lif \Box (!B \lif !A)sourceAB\Box \Diamond !A \lif !Bsource
¬A(AB)\lnot \Diamond !A \lif \Box (!A \lif !B)sourceAA\Box \Box !A \lif \Box !Asource
(AB)(AB)\Diamond (!A \lor !B) \liff (\Diamond !A \lor \Diamond !B)sourceAA\Box \Diamond !A \lif \Diamond \Box !Asource
source 133

captionValid and (or?) invalid schemas.

Exercise proving the table classifications

Prove that the schemas in the first column of the table of six paired valid and invalid schemas are valid and those in the second column are not valid.

Exercise classifying two modal schemas

Decide whether the following schemas are valid or invalid:

  1. (AB)(AB)(\Diamond !A \lif \Box !B) \lif (\Box !A \lif \Box !B)source;

  2. (AB)(BA)\Diamond(!A \lif !B) \lor \Box(!B \lif !A)source.

Exercise finding models that validate every instance

For each of the following schemas find a model M\mModel{M}source such that every instance of the formula is true in M\mModel{M}source:

  1. ppp \lif \Diamond\Diamond psource;

  2. pp\Diamond p \lif \Box psource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/entailment.tex

Entailment

Explain

With the definition of truth at a world, we can define an entailment relation between formulas. A formula B!Bsource entails A!Asource iff, whenever B!Bsource is true, A!Asource is true as well. Here, “whenever” means both “whichever model we consider” as well as “whichever world in that model we consider.”

Definition of modal entailment

If Γ\Gammasource is a set of formulas and A!Asource a formula, then Γ\Gammasource entails A!Asource, in symbols: ΓA\Gamma \Entails !Asource, if and only if for every model M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source and world wWw \in Wsource, if MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source for every BΓ!B \in \Gammasource, then MA[w]\mSat{M}{!A}[w]source. If Γ\Gammasource contains a single formula B!Bsource, then we write BA!B \Entails !Asource.

Worked entailment and countermodel example

To show that a formula entails another, we have to reason about all models, using the definition of M[w]\mSat{M}{}[w]source. For instance, to show pp¬p¬pp \lif \Diamond p \Entails \Box\lnot p \lif \lnot psource, we might argue as follows: Consider a model M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source and wWw \in Wsource, and suppose Mpp[w]\mSat{M}{p \lif \Diamond p}[w]source. We have to show that M¬p¬p[w]\mSat{M}{\Box\lnot p \lif \lnot p}[w]source. Suppose not. Then M¬p[w]\mSat{M}{\Box\lnot p}[w]source and M¬p[w]\mSat/{M}{\lnot p}[w]source. Since M¬p[w]\mSat/{M}{\lnot p}[w]source, Mp[w]\mSat{M}{ p}[w]source. By assumption, Mpp[w]\mSat{M}{p \lif \Diamond p}[w]source, hence Mp[w]\mSat{M}{\Diamond p}[w]source. By definition of Mp[w]\mSat{M}{\Diamond p}[w]source, there is some ww'source with RwwRww'source such that Mp[w]\mSat{M}{p}[w']source. Since also M¬p[w]\mSat{M}{\Box \lnot p}[w]source, M¬p[w]\mSat{M}{\lnot p}[w']source, a contradiction.

To show that a formula B!Bsource does not entail another A!Asource, we have to give a counterexample, i.e., a model M=W,R,V\mModel{M} = \tuple{W, R, V}source where we show that at some world wWw \in Wsource, MB[w]\mSat{M}{!B}[w]source but MA[w]\mSat/{M}{!A}[w]source. Let's show that ppppp \lif \Diamond p \Entails/ \Box p \lif psource. Consider the model in the three-world countermodel figure. We have Mp[w1]\mSat{M}{\Diamond p}[w_1]source and hence Mpp[w1]\mSat{M}{p \lif \Diamond p}[w_1]source. However, since Mp[w1]\mSat{M}{\Box p}[w_1]source but Mp[w1]\mSat/{M}{p}[w_1]source, we have Mpp[w1]\mSat/{M}{\Box p \lif p}[w_1]source.

Figure containing the modal countermodel

The figure contains the source graph with p false at w one, p true at w two and w three, and exactly the arrows from w one to each of w two and w three. Its inner TikZ object supplies the ordered structural reading.

Source transcription

Three-world countermodel graph

Countermodel graph. Node one is w subscript one, with printed valuation p is false. Node two is w subscript two, with printed valuation p is true. Node three is w subscript three, with printed valuation p is true. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: from w subscript one to w subscript two; then from w subscript one to w subscript three. Only p is printed in this diagram; no value for any other atom is inferred. End countermodel graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: w subscript one¬p\mFalse{p}sourcew1w_1source
  2. Node 2: w subscript twop\mTrue{p}sourcew2w_2source
  3. Node 3: w subscript threep\mTrue{p}sourcew3w_3source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
  2. Edge 2: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
source 55

captionCounterexample to ppppp \lif \Diamond p \Entails \Box p \lif psource.

Often very simple counterexamples suffice. The model M={W,R,V}\mModel{M'} = \{W', R', V'\}source with W={w}W' = \{w\}source, R=R' = \emptysetsource, and V(p)=V'(p) = \emptysetsource is also a counterexample: Since Mp[w]\mSat/{M'}{p}[w]source, Mpp[w]\mSat{M'}{p \lif \Diamond p}[w]source. As no worlds are accessible from wwsource, we have Mp[w]\mSat{M'}{\Box p}[w]source, and so Mpp[w]\mSat/{M'}{\Box p \lif p}[w]source.

Exercise proving a modal entailment

Show that (AB)A\Box (!A \land !B) \Entails \Box !Asource.

Exercise proving two non-entailments

Show that (pq)pq\Box (p \lif q) \Entails/ p \lif \Box qsource and pq(pq)p \lif \Box q \Entails/\Box (p \lif q)source.

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