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Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/syntax-and-semantics.tex
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/introduction.tex
Introduction
Modal logic deals with modal propositions and the entailment relations among them. Examples of modal propositions are the following:
It is necessary that source.
It is necessarily possible that it will rain tomorrow.
If it is necessarily possible that source then it is possible that source.
Possibility and necessity are not the only modalities: other unary connectives are also classified as modalities, for instance, “it ought to be the case that source,” “It will be the case that source,” “Dana knows that source,” or “Dana believes that source.”
Modal logic makes its first appearance in Aristotle's De Interpretatione: he was the first to notice that necessity implies possibility, but not vice versa; that possibility and necessity are inter-definable; that If source is possibly true then source is possibly true and source is possibly true, but not conversely; and that if source is necessary, then if source is necessary, so is source.
The first modern approach to modal logic was the work of C. I. Lewis, culminating with Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic (1932). Lewis & Langford were unhappy with the representation of implication by means of the material conditional: source is a poor substitute for “source implies source.” Instead, they proposed to characterize implication as “Necessarily, if source then source,” symbolized as source. In trying to sort out the different properties, Lewis identified five different modal systems, LogS1, ldots, LogS4, LogS5, the last two of which are still in use.
The approach of Lewis and Langford was purely syntactical: they identified reasonable axioms and rules and investigated what was provable with those means. A semantic approach remained elusive for a long time, until a first attempt was made by Rudolf Carnap in Meaning and Necessity (1947) using the notion of a state description, i.e., a collection of atomic sentences (those that are “true” in that state description). After lifting the truth definition to arbitrary sentences source, Carnap defines source to be necessarily true if it is true in all state descriptions. Carnap's approach could not handle iterated modalities, in that sentences of the form “Possibly necessarily ldots possibly source” always reduce to the innermost modality.
The major breakthrough in modal semantics came with Saul Kripke's article “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic” (JSL 1959). Kripke based his work on Leibniz's idea that a statement is necessarily true if it is true “at all possible worlds.” This idea, though, suffers from the same drawbacks as Carnap's, in that the truth of statement at a world source (or a state description source) does not depend on source at all. So Kripke assumed that worlds are related by an accessibility relation source, and that a statement of the form “Necessarily source” is true at a world source if and only if source is true at all worlds source accessible from source. Semantics that provide some version of this approach are called Kripke semantics and made possible the tumultuous development of modal logics (in the plural).
When interpreted by the Kripke semantics, modal logic shows us what relational structures look like “from the inside.” A relational structure is just a set equipped with a binary relation (for instance, the set of students in the class ordered by their social security number is a relational structure). But in fact relational structures come in all sorts of domains: besides relative possibility of states of the world, we can have epistemic states of some agent related by epistemic possibility, or states of a dynamical system with their state transitions, etc. Modal logic can be used to model all of these: the first gives us ordinary, alethic, modal logic; the others give us epistemic logic, dynamic logic, etc.
We focus on one particular angle, known to modal logicians as “correspondence theory.” One of the most significant early discoveries of Kripke's is that many properties of the accessibility relation source (whether it is transitive, symmetric, etc.) can be characterized in the modal language itself by means of appropriate “modal schemas.” Modal logicians say, for instance, that the reflexivity of source “corresponds” to the schema “If necessarily source, then source”. We explore mainly the correspondence theory of a number of classical systems of modal logic (e.g., LogS4 and LogS5) obtained by a combination of the schemas AxD, AxT, AxB, Ax4, and Ax5.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/language-modal-logic.tex
The Language of Basic Modal Logic
Primitive symbols of the basic modal language
The basic language of modal logic contains
Inductive definition of basic modal formulas
Formulas of the basic modal language are inductively defined as follows:
Projected abbreviations for defined modal operators
Formulas constructed using the defined operators are to be understood as follows:
Tagenumerate
defTrue,defFalse,defNot,defOr,defAnd,defIf,defIff,defBox,defDiamond
If a formula source does not contain source or source, we say it is modal-free.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/substitution.tex
Simultaneous Substitution
An instance of a formula source is the result of replacing all occurrences of a propositional variable in source by some other formula. We will refer to instances of formulas often, both when discussing validity and when discussing derivability. It therefore is useful to define the notion precisely.
Definition of simultaneous substitution
Where source is a modal formula all of whose propositional variables are among source, dots, source, and source, dots, source are also modal formulas, we define source as the result of simultaneously substituting each source for source in source. Formally, this is a definition by induction on source:
Case: source
Case: source
Case: source
Case: source
Case: source
source is
Case: source
source is
Case: source
source is
Case: source
source is
Case: source
Case: source
The formula source is called a substitution instance of source.
Example contrasting simultaneous and iterated substitution
Suppose source is source, source is source and source is source. Then source is
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/relational-models.tex
Relational Models
The basic concept of semantics for normal modal logics is that of a relational model. It consists of a set of worlds, which are related by a binary “accessibility relation,” together with an assignment which determines which propositional variables count as “true” at which worlds.
Definition of a relational modal model
A model for the basic modal language is a triple source, where
source is a nonempty set of “worlds,”
source is a function assigning to each propositional variable source a set source of possible worlds.
When source holds, we say that source is accessible from source. When source we say source is true at source.
The great advantage of relational semantics is that models can be represented by means of simple diagrams, such as the one in the simple three-world model figure. Worlds are represented by nodes, and world source is accessible from source precisely when there is an arrow from source to source. Moreover, we label a node (world) by source when source, and otherwise by source. the simple three-world model figure represents the model with source, source, source, and source.
Figure containing the simple three-world model
The figure contains the source model graph with worlds w one, w two, and w three, printed truth labels for p and q at every world, and exactly two arrows, both from w one. Its inner TikZ object supplies the ordered structural reading.
Source transcription
Simple three-world relational model
Model graph. Node one is w subscript one. Its printed valuations are, in source order, p is true and q is false. Node two is w subscript two. Its printed valuations are p is true and q is true. Node three is w subscript three. Its printed valuations are p is false and q is false. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: from w subscript one to w subscript two; then from w subscript one to w subscript three. No loop or further edge is printed. End model graph.
Nodes
- Node 1: w subscript onesourcesourcesource
- Node 2: w subscript twosourcesourcesource
- Node 3: w subscript threesourcesourcesource
Edges
- Edge 1: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
- Edge 2: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
captionA simple model.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/truth-at-w.tex
Truth at a World
Every modal model determines which modal formulas count as true at which worlds in it. The relation “model source makes formula source true at world source” is the basic notion of relational semantics. The relation is defined inductively and coincides with the usual characterization using truth tables for the non-modal operators.
Inductive definition of truth at a world
Truth of a formula source at source in a source, in symbols: source, is defined inductively as follows:
Note that by clause the necessity clause in the definition of truth at a world, a formula source is true at source whenever there are no source with source. In such a case source is vacuously true at source. Also, source may be satisfied at source even if source is not. The truth of source at source does not guarantee the truth of source at source. This holds, however, if source, e.g., if source is reflexive. If there is no source such that source, then source, for any source.
Exercise evaluating nine formulas in the simple model
Consider the model of the simple three-world model figure. Which of the following hold?
Duality of necessity and possibility
Proof
source iff source by definition of source. source iff for some source with source, source. Hence, source iff for all source with source, source. We also have source iff source. Together we have source iff for all source with source, source. Again by definition of source, that is the case iff source.
Exercise.
Exercise completing the modal duality proof
probDiamond Complete the proof of the proposition on duality of necessity and possibility.
Exercise on worlds with matching atoms and successors
Let source be a model, and suppose source are such that:
Using induction on formulas, show that for all formulas source: source if and only if source.
Exercise on not-possible and necessary-not
prvDiamond Let source. Show that source if and only if source.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/truth-in-model.tex
Truth in a Model
Sometimes we are interested in which formulas are true at every world in a given model. Let's introduce a notation for this.
Definition of truth throughout a model
A formula source is true in a model source, written source, if and only if source for every source.
Two facts about truth throughout a model
Proof
If source then source is true at all worlds in source, and since source, it can't be that source, or else source would have to be both true and false at some world.
On the other hand, if source then source is true at some world source. It does not follow that source for every source. For instance, in the model of the simple three-world model figure, source, and also source.
Assume source and source; to show source let source be an arbitrary world. Then source and source, so source, and since source was arbitrary, source.
To show that the converse fails, we need to find a model source such that source only if source, but source. Consider again the model of the simple three-world model figure: source and hence (vacuously) source only if source. However, source, as source is true but source false at source.
Exercise evaluating formulas throughout a three-world model
Consider the following model source for the language comprising source, source, source as the only propositional variables:
Three-world model for the global-truth exercise
Exercise model graph. Node one is w subscript one. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is false, and p subscript three is false. Node two is w subscript two. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is true, and p subscript three is false. Node three is w subscript three. Its printed valuations are p subscript one is true, p subscript two is true, and p subscript three is true. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: a loop at w subscript three; from w subscript one to w subscript two; from w subscript two to w subscript three; and from w subscript one to w subscript three. End exercise model graph.
Nodes
- Node 1: w subscript onesourcesourcesourcesource
- Node 2: w subscript twosourcesourcesourcesource
- Node 3: w subscript threesourcesourcesourcesource
Edges
- Edge 1: w3 to w3; accessibility relation R; loop.
- Edge 2: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
- Edge 3: w2 to w3; accessibility relation R.
- Edge 4: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
Are the following formulas and schemas true in the model source, i.e., true at every world in source? Explain.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/modal-validity.tex
Validity
Explain
Formulas that are true in all models, i.e., true at every world in every model, are particularly interesting. They represent those modal propositions which are true regardless of how source and source are interpreted, as long as the interpretation is “normal” in the sense that it is generated by some accessibility relation on possible worlds. We call such formulas valid. For instance, source is valid. Some formulas one might expect to be valid on the basis of the alethic interpretation of source, such as source, are not valid, however. Part of the interest of relational models is that different interpretations of source and source can be captured by different kinds of accessibility relations. This suggests that we should define validity not just relative to all models, but relative to all models of a certain kind. It will turn out, e.g., that source is true in all models where every world is accessible from itself, i.e., source is reflexive. Defining validity relative to classes of models enables us to formulate this succinctly: source is valid in the class of reflexive models.
Definition of validity relative to a class of models
A formula source is valid in a class source of models if it is true in every model in source (i.e., true at every world in every model in source). If source is valid in source, we write source, and we write source if source is valid in the class of all models.
Validity is inherited by subclasses
If source is valid in source it is also valid in each class source.
Validity is closed under necessitation
Proof
Assume source. To show source let source be a model and source. If source then source, since source is valid, and so also source. Since source and source were arbitrary, source.
Exercise proving three valid modal formulas
Show that the following are valid:
Exercise on validity in singleton and edgeless models
Show that source is valid in the class source of models source where source. Similarly, show that source and source are valid in the class of models source where source.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/tautological-instances.tex
Tautological Instances
Explain
A modal-free formula is a tautology if it is true under every truth-value assignment. Clearly, every tautology is true at every world in every model. But for formulas involving source and source, the notion of tautology is not defined. Is it the case, e.g., that source---an instance of the principle of excluded middle---is valid? The notion of a tautological instance helps: a formula that is a substitution instance of a (non-modal) tautology. It is not surprising, but still requires proof, that every tautological instance is valid.
Definition of a tautological instance
A modal formula source is a tautological instance if and only if there is a modal-free tautology source with propositional variables source, dots, source and formulas source, dots, source such that source.
Lemma transferring a modal-free valuation into a model
Suppose source is a modal-free formula whose propositional variables are source, dots, source, and let source, dots, source be modal formulas. Then for any assignment source, any model source, and any source such that source if and only if source we have that source if and only if source.
Proof
By induction on source.
Every tautological instance is valid
All tautological instances are valid.
Proof
Contrapositively, suppose source is such that source, for some model source and world source. Define an assignment source such that source if and only if source (and source assigns arbitrary values to source). Then by the lemma transferring modal-free satisfaction to a substitution instance, source, so source is not a tautology.
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/schemas.tex
Schemas and Validity
Definition of a modal schema
A schema is a set of formulas comprising all and only the substitution instances of some modal formula source, i.e.,
The formula source is called the characteristic formula of the schema, and it is unique up to a renaming of the propositional variables. A formula source is an instance of a schema if it is a member of the set.
It is convenient to denote a schema by the meta-linguistic expression obtained by substituting `source', `source', dots, for the atomic components of source. So, for instance, the following denote schemas: `source', `source', `source'. They correspond to the characteristic formulas source, source, source. The schema `source' denotes the set of all formulas.
Truth and validity of a schema
A schema is true in a model if and only if all of its instances are; and a schema is valid if and only if it is true in every model.
Validity of the K schema
The following schema AxK is valid
Proof
We need to show that all instances of the schema are true at every world in every model. So let source and source be arbitrary. To show that a conditional is true at a world we assume the antecedent is true to show that the consequent is true as well. In this case, let source and source. We need to show source. So let source be arbitrary such that source. Then by the first assumption source and by the second assumption source. It follows that source. Since source was arbitrary, source.
Validity of the Dual schema
The following schema Dual is valid
Proof
Exercise.
Exercise proving the Dual schema
Semantic modus ponens
If source and source are true at a world in a model then so is source. Hence, the valid formulas are closed under modus ponens.
Validity is equivalent to validity of every substitution instance
A formula source is valid iff all its substitution instances are. In other words, a schema is valid iff its characteristic formula is.
Proof
The “if” direction is obvious, since source is a substitution instance of itself.
To prove the “only if” direction, we show the following: Suppose source is a modal model, and source is a substitution instance of source. Define source by source. Then source iff source, for any source. (We leave the proof as an exercise.) Now suppose that source was valid, but some substitution instance source of source was not valid. Then for some source and some source, source. But then source by the claim, and source is not valid, a contradiction.
Exercise proving the substitution-model claim
Prove the claim in the “only if” part of the proof of the proposition equating validity with validity of every substitution instance. (Hint: use induction on source.)
Note, however, that it is not true that a schema is true in a model iff its characteristic formula is. Of course, the “only if” direction holds: if every instance of source is true in source, source itself is true in source. But it may happen that source is true in source but some instance of source is false at some world in source. For a very simple counterexample consider source in a model with only one world source and source, so that source is true at source. But source is an instance of source, and not true at source.
Exercise showing five familiar modal schemas are not generally valid
Show that none of the following formulas are valid:
Outer table of valid and invalid modal schemas
[t] centering
Six paired valid and invalid modal schemas
Two-column schema table. Headers: Valid Schemas; Invalid Schemas. Row one: valid schema if the conditional from A to B is necessary, then if A is possible, B is possible; invalid schema if the disjunction of A and B is necessary, then either A is necessary or B is necessary. Row two: valid schema if the conditional from A to B is possible, then if A is necessary, B is possible; invalid schema if A is possible and B is possible, then the conjunction of A and B is possible. Row three: valid schema the conjunction of A and B is necessary if and only if both A and B are necessary; invalid schema if A, then necessarily A. Row four: valid schema if A is necessary, then the conditional from B to A is necessary; invalid schema if necessarily possibly A, then B. Row five: valid schema if A is not possible, then the conditional from A to B is necessary; invalid schema if necessarily necessarily A, then necessarily A. Row six: valid schema the disjunction of A and B is possible if and only if either A is possible or B is possible; invalid schema if necessarily possibly A, then possibly necessarily A. End schema table.
| Valid Schemas | Invalid Schemas |
|---|---|
| source | source |
| source | source |
| source | source |
| source | source |
| source | source |
| source | source |
captionValid and (or?) invalid schemas.
Exercise proving the table classifications
Prove that the schemas in the first column of the table of six paired valid and invalid schemas are valid and those in the second column are not valid.
Exercise classifying two modal schemas
Decide whether the following schemas are valid or invalid:
Exercise finding models that validate every instance
For each of the following schemas find a model source such that every instance of the formula is true in source:
Source file content/normal-modal-logic/syntax-and-semantics/entailment.tex
Entailment
Explain
With the definition of truth at a world, we can define an entailment relation between formulas. A formula source entails source iff, whenever source is true, source is true as well. Here, “whenever” means both “whichever model we consider” as well as “whichever world in that model we consider.”
Definition of modal entailment
If source is a set of formulas and source a formula, then source entails source, in symbols: source, if and only if for every model source and world source, if source for every source, then source. If source contains a single formula source, then we write source.
Worked entailment and countermodel example
To show that a formula entails another, we have to reason about all models, using the definition of source. For instance, to show source, we might argue as follows: Consider a model source and source, and suppose source. We have to show that source. Suppose not. Then source and source. Since source, source. By assumption, source, hence source. By definition of source, there is some source with source such that source. Since also source, source, a contradiction.
To show that a formula source does not entail another source, we have to give a counterexample, i.e., a model source where we show that at some world source, source but source. Let's show that source. Consider the model in the three-world countermodel figure. We have source and hence source. However, since source but source, we have source.
Figure containing the modal countermodel
The figure contains the source graph with p false at w one, p true at w two and w three, and exactly the arrows from w one to each of w two and w three. Its inner TikZ object supplies the ordered structural reading.
Source transcription
Three-world countermodel graph
Countermodel graph. Node one is w subscript one, with printed valuation p is false. Node two is w subscript two, with printed valuation p is true. Node three is w subscript three, with printed valuation p is true. Directed accessibility edges, in source order: from w subscript one to w subscript two; then from w subscript one to w subscript three. Only p is printed in this diagram; no value for any other atom is inferred. End countermodel graph.
Nodes
- Node 1: w subscript onesourcesource
- Node 2: w subscript twosourcesource
- Node 3: w subscript threesourcesource
Edges
- Edge 1: w1 to w2; accessibility relation R.
- Edge 2: w1 to w3; accessibility relation R.
captionCounterexample to source.
Often very simple counterexamples suffice. The model source with source, source, and source is also a counterexample: Since source, source. As no worlds are accessible from source, we have source, and so source.
Exercise proving a modal entailment
Show that source.
Exercise proving two non-entailments
Source disclosures
- TR050-SAR-002: Source caveat. The negation induction case is routed by the source tag named prvFalse rather than prvNot. Its visible selected mathematical content is preserved; the routing name is not reinterpreted as a falsity case. source
- TR050-SAR-001: Source caveat. The negation induction chain attributes its last modal-satisfaction equivalence to the definition of propositional satisfaction. The displayed formulas and printed attribution are retained. source
- TR050-SAR-003: Source caveat. The table caption literally questions whether the second class is joined by and or or. The displayed column labels Valid Schemas and Invalid Schemas remain the operative source labels; the caption uncertainty is not silently edited away. source
- TR050-SAR-004: Source caveat. The simpler countermodel is introduced with set braces around W prime, R prime, and V prime, although models were defined as ordered triples. The printed braces are preserved and spoken as a source notation difference. source