Normal Modal Logics

Axiomatic Derivations

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Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/axioms-systems.tex

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/introduction.tex

Introduction

We have a semantics for the basic modal language in terms of modal models, and a notion of a formula being valid---true at all worlds in all models---or valid with respect to some class of models or frames---true at all worlds in all models in the class, or based on the frame. Logic usually connects such semantic characterizations of validity with a proof-theoretic notion of derivability. The aim is to define a notion of derivability in some system such that a formula is derivable iff it is valid.

The simplest and historically oldest derivation systems are so-called Hilbert-type or axiomatic derivation systems. Hilbert-type derivation systems for many modal logics are relatively easy to construct: they are simple as objects of metatheoretical study (e.g., to prove soundness and completeness). However, they are much harder to use to prove formulas in than, say, natural deduction systems.

In Hilbert-type derivation systems, a derivation of a formula is a sequence of formulas leading from certain axioms, via a handful of inference rules, to the formula in question. Since we want the derivation system to match the semantics, we have to guarantee that the set of derivable formulas are true in all models (or true in all models in which all axioms are true). We'll first isolate some properties of modal logics that are necessary for this to work: the “normal” modal logics. For normal modal logics, there are only two inference rules that need to be assumed: modus ponens and necessitation. As axioms we take all (substitution instances) of tautologies, and, depending on the modal logic we deal with, a number of modal axioms. Even if we are just interested in the class of all models, we must also count all substitution instances of K\Ax{K}source and Dual\Ax{Dual}source as axioms. This alone generates the minimal normal modal logic K\Log Ksource.

Definition of modus ponens

The rule of modus ponens is the inference schema

Modus ponens inference schema

Source premise node one: formula A. Source premise node two: formula A implies formula B. The next inference is labeled modus ponens. From nodes one, then two, infer node three: formula B. The root conclusion is node three. End proof tree.

  1. Step 1. No premises. Rule: source axiom or displayed premise.

  2. Step 2. No premises. Rule: source axiom or displayed premise.

    AB!A \lif !Bsource
  3. Step 3. Depends on step 1, step 2. Rule: modus ponens.

MP\MPsource
source 48

We say a formula B!Bsource follows from formulas A!Asource, C!Csource by modus ponens iff CAB!C \ident !A \lif !Bsource.

Definition of necessitation

The rule of necessitation is the inference schema

Necessitation inference schema

Source premise node one: formula A. The next inference is labeled necessitation. From node one, infer node two: box formula A. The root conclusion is node two. End proof tree.

  1. Step 1. No premises. Rule: source axiom or displayed premise.

  2. Step 2. Depends on step 1. Rule: necessitation.

    A\Box !Asource
nec\Necsource
source 60

We say the formula B!Bsource follows from the formulas A!Asource by necessitation iff BA!B \ident \Box !Asource.

Definition of an axiomatic derivation

A derivation from a set of axioms Σ\Sigmasource is a sequence of formulas B1!B_1source, B2!B_2source, dots, Bn!B_nsource, where each Bi!B_isource is either

  1. a substitution instance of a tautology, or

  2. a substitution instance of a formula in Σ\Sigmasource, or

  3. follows from two formulas Bj!B_jsource, Bk!B_ksource with jjsource, k<ik < isource by modus ponens, or

  4. follows from a formula Bj!B_jsource with j<ij < isource by necessitation.

If there is such a derivation with BnA!B_n \ident !Asource, we say that A!Asource is derivable from Σ\Sigmasource, in symbols ΣA\Sigma \Proves !Asource.

With this definition, it will turn out that the set of derivable formulas forms a normal modal logic, and that any derivable formula is true in every model in which every axiom is true. This property of derivations is called soundness. The converse, completeness, is harder to prove.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/normal-logics.tex

Normal Modal Logics

Not every set of modal formulas can easily be characterized as those formulas derivable from a set of axioms. We want modal logics to be well-behaved. First of all, everything we can derive in classical propositional logic should still be derivable, of course taking into account that the formulas may now contain also \Boxsource and \Diamondsource . To this end, we require that a modal logic contain all tautological instances and be closed under modus ponens.

Definition of a modal logic

A modal logic is a set Σ\Sigmasource of modal formulas which

  1. contains all tautologies, and

  2. is closed under substitution, i.e., if AΣ!A \in \Sigmasource, and D1!D_1source, dots, Dn!D_nsource are formulas, then

    A[D1/p1,,Dn/pn]Σ,\SSubst{!A}{\subst{!D_1}{p_1}, \dots, \subst{!D_n}{p_n}} \in \Sigma,source
  3. is closed under modus ponens, i.e., if A!Asource and ABΣ!A \lif !B \in \Sigmasource, then BΣ!B \in \Sigmasource.

In order to use the relational semantics for modal logics, we also have to require that all formulas valid in all modal models are included. It turns out that this requirement is met as soon as all instances of AxK and Dual are derivable, and whenever a formula A!Asource is derivable, so is A\Box !Asource. A modal logic that satisfies these conditions is called normal. (Of course, there are also non-normal modal logics, but the usual relational models are not adequate for them.)

Definition of a normal modal logic

A modal logic Σ\Sigmasource is normal if it contains

row label K(pq)(pq),row label dualp¬¬p\tag{\Ax{K}} & \Box(p \lif q) \lif (\Box p \lif \Box q), \\ \tag{\Dual} & \Diamond p \liff \lnot\Box\lnot psource

and is closed under necessitation, i.e., if AΣ!A \in \Sigmasource, then AΣ\Box !A \in \Sigmasource.

Observe that while tautological implication is “fine-grained” enough to preserve truth at a world, the rule Nec only preserves truth in a model (and hence also validity in a frame or in a class of frames).

Normal modal logics are closed under rule R K

Every normal modal logic is closed under rule RK,

Rule R K inference schema

Source premise node one: formula A subscript one implies open parenthesis formula A subscript two implies and so on open parenthesis formula A subscript n - one implies formula A subscript n close parenthesis and so on close parenthesis. The next inference is labeled rule R K. From node one, infer node two: box formula A subscript one implies open parenthesis box formula A subscript two implies and so on open parenthesis box formula A subscript n - one implies box formula A subscript n close parenthesis and so on close parenthesis period. The root conclusion is node two. End proof tree.

  1. Step 1. No premises. Rule: source axiom or displayed premise.

    A1(A2(An1An))!A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_{n-1} \lif !A_n)\cdots)source
  2. Step 2. Depends on step 1. Rule: rule R K.

    A1(A2(An1An)).\Box!A_1 \lif (\Box!A_2 \lif \cdots (\Box!A_{n-1} \lif \Box!A_n)\cdots).source
RK\RKsource
source 64

Proof

By induction on nnsource: If n=1n = 1source, then the rule is just Nec, and every normal modal logic is closed under Nec.

Now suppose the result holds for n1n-1source; we show it holds for nnsource.

Assume

A1(A2(An1An))ΣBy the induction hypothesis, we haveA1(A2(An1An))ΣSince Σ is a normal modal logic, it contains all instances of K, in particular(An1An)(An1An)ΣUsing modus ponens and suitable tautological instances we getA1(A2(An1An))Σ.& !A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_{n-1} \lif !A_n)\cdots) \in \Sigma \intertext{By the induction hypothesis, we have} & \Box!A_1 \lif (\Box!A_2 \lif \cdots \Box(!A_{n-1} \lif !A_n)\cdots) \in \Sigma \intertext{Since $\Sigma$ is a normal modal logic, it contains all instances of~$\Ax{K}$, in particular} & \Box(!A_{n-1} \lif !A_n) \lif (\Box!A_{n-1} \lif \Box!A_n) \in \Sigma \intertext{Using modus ponens and suitable tautological instances we get} & \Box!A_1 \lif (\Box!A_2 \lif \cdots (\Box!A_{n-1} \lif \Box!A_n)\cdots) \in \Sigma.source

Normal modal logics exclude possible falsity

Every normal modal logic Σ\Sigmasource contains ¬\lnot\Diamond\lfalsesource.

Exercise on possible falsity

Prove the proposition that no normal modal logic permits possibly falsity.

Existence of the smallest generated modal logic

Let A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource be formulas. Then there is a smallest modal logic Σ\Sigmasource containing all instances of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource.

Proof

Given A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource, define Σ\Sigmasource as the intersection of all normal modal logics containing all instances of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource. The intersection is non-empty as Frm(L)\Frm[L]source, the set of all formulas, is such a modal logic.

Definition of a modal system

The smallest normal modal logic containing A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource is called a modal system and denoted by KA1An\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_nsource. The smallest normal modal logic is denoted by LogK.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/logics-proofs.tex

derivation and Modal Systems

We first define what a derivation is for normal modal logics. Roughly, a derivation is a sequence of formulas in which every element is either (a substitution instance of) one of a number of axioms, or follows from previous elements by one of a few inference rules. For normal modal logics, all instances of tautologies , AxK, and Dual count as axioms. This results in the modal system K\Log{K}source, the smallest normal modal logic. We may wish to add additional axioms to obtain other systems, however. The rules are always modus ponens MP and necessitation Nec.

Definition of derivability in a modal system

Given a modal system KA1An\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_nsource and a formula B!Bsource we say that B!Bsource is derivable in KA1An\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_nsource, written KA1AnB\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_n \Proves !Bsource, if and only if there are formulas C1!C_1source, dots, Ck!C_ksource such that Ck=B!C_k = !Bsource and each Ci!C_isource is either a tautological instance, or an instance of one of K\Ax{K}source, dual\Dualsource, A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource, or it follows from previous formulas by means of the rules MP or Nec.

The following proposition allows us to show that BΣ!B \in \Sigmasource by exhibiting a Σ\Sigmasource-derivation of B!Bsource.

Modal-system membership equals derivability

KA1An={B:KA1AnB}\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_n = \Setabs{!B}{\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_n \Proves !B}source.

Proof

We use induction on the length of derivations to show that {B:KA1AnB}KA1An\Setabs{!B}{\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_n \Proves !B} \subseteq \Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_nsource.

If the derivation of B!Bsource has length 11source, it contains a single formula. That formula cannot follow from previous formulas by MP or Nec, so must be a tautological instance, an instance of AxK, dual\Dualsource, or an instance of one of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource. But KA1An\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_nsource contains these as well, so BKA1An!B \in \Log{K}!A_1 \dots !A_nsource.

If the derivation of B!Bsource has length >1> 1source, then B!Bsource may in addition be obtained by MP or Nec from formulas not occurring as the last line in the derivation. If B!Bsource follows from C!Csource and CB!C \lif !Bsource (by MP), then C!Csource and CBKA1An!C \lif !B \in \Log{K}!A_1 \dots !A_nsource by induction hypothesis. But every modal logic is closed under modus ponens, so BKA1An!B \in \Log{K}!A_1 \dots !A_nsource. If BC!B \equiv \Box !Csource follows from C!Csource by Nec, then CKA1An!C \in \Log{K}!A_1 \dots !A_nsource by induction hypothesis. But every normal modal logic is closed under nec\Necsource, so BKA1An!B \in \Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_nsource.

The converse inclusion follows by showing that Σ={B:KA1AnB}\Sigma = \Setabs{!B}{\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_n \Proves !B }source is a normal modal logic containing all the instances of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource, and the observation that KA1An\Log{K} !A_1 \dots !A_nsource is, by definition, the smallest such logic.

  1. Every tautology B!Bsource is a tautological instance, so KA1AnB\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves !Bsource, so Σ\Sigmasource contains all tautologies.

  2. If KA1AnC\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves !Csource and KA1AnCB\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves !C \lif !Bsource, then KA1AnB\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves !Bsource: Combine the derivation of C!Csource with that of CB!C \lif !Bsource, and add the line B!Bsource. The last line is justified by MP. So Σ\Sigmasource is closed under modus ponens.

  3. If B!Bsource has a derivation, then every substitution instance of B!Bsource also has a derivation: apply the substitution to every formula in the derivation. (Exercise: prove by induction on the length of derivations that the result is also a correct derivation). So Σ\Sigmasource is closed under uniform substitution. (We have now established that Σ\Sigmasource satisfies all conditions of a modal logic.)

  4. We have KA1AnK\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves \Ax{K}source, so KΣK \in \Sigmasource.

  5. We have KA1Andual\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves \Dualsource, so dualΣ\Dual \in \Sigmasource.

  6. If KA1AnC\Log{K}!A_1\dots!A_n \Proves !Csource, the additional line C\Box !Csource is justified by Nec. Consequently, Σ\Sigmasource is closed under Nec. Thus, Σ\Sigmasource is normal.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/proofs-in-K.tex

Proofs in LogK

In order to practice proofs in the smallest modal system, we show the valid formulas on the left-hand side of the table of valid and invalid modal schemata can all be given LogK-proofs.

Boxed weakening theorem

KA(BA)\Log{K} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box (!B\lif !A)source

Proof

Four-line K proof of boxed weakening

Derivation. Line one: formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies formula A close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: box open parenthesis formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies formula A close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: necessitation. Line three: box open parenthesis formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies formula A close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula A implies box open parenthesis formula B implies formula A close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line four: box formula A implies box open parenthesis formula B implies formula A close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. A(BA)!A \lif (!B \lif !A)source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. (A(BA))\Box(!A \lif (!B \lif !A))source Justification: necessitation. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. (A(BA))(A(BA))\Box(!A \lif (!B \lif !A)) \lif (\Box!A \lif \Box(!B \lif !A))source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. A(BA)\Box!A \lif \Box (!B\lif !A)source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-2, line-3. Discharges: none.

source 23

Box distributes to both conjuncts

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Box(!A \land !B) \lif (\Box !A \land \Box!B)source

Proof

Eleven-line K proof distributing box over conjunction

Derivation. Line one: open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula A. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: box open parenthesis open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula A close parenthesis. Justification: necessitation. Line three: box open parenthesis open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula A close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula A close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line four: box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula A. Justification: modus ponens. Line five: open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula B. Justification: tautological instance. Line six: box open parenthesis open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula B close parenthesis. Justification: necessitation. Line seven: box open parenthesis open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula B close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line eight: box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula B. Justification: modus ponens. Line nine: open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula A close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: tautological instance. Source justification formulas, in order: open parenthesis open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula B close parenthesis implies open set close set; then open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line ten: open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies box formula B close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: modus ponens. Source justification formula, in order: open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line eleven: box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. (AB)A(!A \land !B) \lif !Asource Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. ((AB)A)\Box((!A \land !B) \lif !A)source Justification: necessitation. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. ((AB)A)((AB)A)\Box((!A \land !B) \lif !A) \lif (\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!A)source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. (AB)A\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!Asource Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-2, line-3. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. (AB)B(!A \land !B) \lif !Bsource Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  6. Line 6. ((AB)B)\Box((!A \land !B) \lif !B)source Justification: necessitation. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  7. Line 7. ((AB)B)((AB)B)\Box((!A \land !B) \lif !B) \lif (\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!B)source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  8. Line 8. (AB)B\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!Bsource Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-6, line-7. Discharges: none.

  9. Line 9. ((AB)A)(\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!A) \lif{}source(((AB)B)((\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!B) \lif{}source((AB)(AB)))(\Box(!A \land !B) \lif (\Box !A \land \Box!B)))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  10. Line 10. ((AB)B)(\Box(!A \land !B) \lif \Box!B) \lif{}source((AB)(AB))(\Box(!A \land !B) \lif (\Box !A \land \Box!B))source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-4, line-9. Discharges: none.

  11. Line 11. (AB)(AB)\Box(!A \land !B) \lif (\Box !A \land \Box!B)source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-8, line-10. Discharges: none.

source 37

Note that the formula on line 99source is an instance of the tautology

(pq)((pr)(p(qr))).(p \lif q) \lif ((p \lif r) \lif (p \lif (q \land r))).source

Two necessary conjuncts imply their necessary conjunction

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K}\Proves (\Box!A \land \Box!B) \lif \Box (!A \land !B)source

Proof

Ten-line K proof combining two boxed conjuncts

Derivation. Line one: formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: box open parenthesis formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: necessitation. Line three: box open parenthesis formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula A implies box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line four: box formula A implies box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. Line five: box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line six: open parenthesis box formula A implies box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: tautological instance. Source justification formulas, in order: open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open set close set; then open parenthesis box formula A implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line seven: open parenthesis box open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: modus ponens. Source justification formula, in order: open parenthesis box formula A implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line eight: box formula A implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. Line nine: open parenthesis box formula A implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: tautological instance. Source justification formula, in order: open parenthesis open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line ten: open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. A(B(AB))!A \lif (!B \lif (!A \land !B))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. (A(B(AB)))\Box(!A \lif (!B \lif (!A \land !B)))source Justification: necessitation. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. (A(B(AB)))(A(B(AB)))\Box(!A \lif (!B \lif (!A \land !B))) \lif (\Box!A \lif \Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B)))source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. A(B(AB))\Box!A \lif \Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B))source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-2, line-3. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. (B(AB))(B(AB))\Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B)) \lif (\Box!B \lif \Box(!A \land !B))source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  6. Line 6. (A(B(AB)))(\Box!A \lif \Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B))) \lif {}source((B(AB))(B(AB)))(\Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B)) \lif (\Box!B \lif \Box(!A \land !B))) \lif {}source(A(B(AB))))(\Box!A \lif (\Box !B \lif \Box(!A \land !B))))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  7. Line 7. ((B(AB))(B(AB)))(\Box(!B \lif (!A \land !B)) \lif (\Box!B \lif \Box(!A \land !B))) \lif {}source(A(B(AB)))(\Box!A \lif (\Box !B \lif \Box(!A \land !B)))source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-4, line-6. Discharges: none.

  8. Line 8. A(B(AB)))\Box!A \lif (\Box !B \lif \Box(!A \land !B)))source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-5, line-7. Discharges: none.

  9. Line 9. (A(B(AB))))(\Box!A \lif (\Box !B \lif \Box(!A \land !B)))) \lif {}source((AB)(AB))((\Box!A \land \Box!B) \lif \Box(!A \land !B))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  10. Line 10. (AB)(AB)(\Box!A \land \Box!B) \lif \Box(!A \land !B)source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-8, line-9. Discharges: none.

source 66

The formulas on lines 66source and 99source are instances of the tautologies

(pq)((qr)(pr))(p(qr))((pq)r)(p \lif q) & \lif ((q \lif r) \lif (p \lif r)) \\ (p \lif (q \lif r)) & \lif ((p \land q) \lif r)source

Box and diamond under negation

K¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource

Proof

Twelve-line K proof relating box and diamond under negation

Derivation. Line one: diamond not propositional variable p if and only if not box not not propositional variable p. Justification: duality axiom. Line two: open parenthesis diamond not propositional variable p if and only if not box not not propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: tautological instance. Source justification formula, in order: open parenthesis not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p close parenthesis. Line three: not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: modus ponens. Line four: not not propositional variable p implies propositional variable p. Justification: tautological instance. Line five: box open parenthesis not not propositional variable p implies propositional variable p close parenthesis. Justification: necessitation. Line six: box open parenthesis not not propositional variable p implies propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box not not propositional variable p implies box propositional variable p close parenthesis. Justification: axiom K. Line seven: open parenthesis box not not propositional variable p implies box propositional variable p close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. Line eight: open parenthesis box not not propositional variable p implies box propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not box propositional variable p implies not box not not propositional variable p close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line nine: not box propositional variable p implies not box not not propositional variable p. Justification: modus ponens. Line ten: open parenthesis not box propositional variable p implies not box not not propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open set close set. Justification: tautological instance. Source justification formula, in order: open parenthesis open parenthesis not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not box propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p close parenthesis close parenthesis. Line eleven: open parenthesis not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not box propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p close parenthesis. Justification: modus ponens. Line twelve: not box propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: modus ponens. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. ¬p¬¬¬p\Diamond \lnot p \liff \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot psource Justification: duality axiom. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. (¬p¬¬¬p)(\Diamond \lnot p \liff \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot p) \lif {}source(¬¬¬p¬p)(\lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot p)source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. ¬¬¬p¬p\lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-1, line-2. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. ¬¬pp\lnot\lnot p \lif psource Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. (¬¬pp)\Box(\lnot\lnot p \lif p)source Justification: necessitation. Depends on: line-4. Discharges: none.

  6. Line 6. (¬¬pp)(¬¬pp)\Box(\lnot\lnot p \lif p) \lif (\Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Box p)source Justification: axiom K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  7. Line 7. (¬¬pp)(\Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Box p)source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-5, line-6. Discharges: none.

  8. Line 8. (¬¬pp)(¬p¬¬¬p)(\Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Box p) \lif (\lnot \Box p \lif \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot p)source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  9. Line 9. ¬p¬¬¬p\lnot \Box p \lif \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot psource Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-7, line-8. Discharges: none.

  10. Line 10. (¬p¬¬¬p)(\lnot \Box p \lif \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot p) \lif {}source((¬¬¬p¬p)(¬p¬p))((\lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot p) \lif (\lnot \Box p \lif \Diamond\lnot p))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  11. Line 11. (¬¬¬p¬p)(¬p¬p)(\lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot p) \lif (\lnot \Box p \lif \Diamond\lnot p)source Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-9, line-10. Discharges: none.

  12. Line 12. ¬p¬p\lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource Justification: modus ponens. Depends on: line-3, line-11. Discharges: none.

source 96

The formulas on lines 88source and 1010source are instances of the tautologies

(pq)(¬q¬p)(pq)((qr)(pr)).& (p \lif q) \lif (\lnot q \lif \lnot p) \\ & (p \lif q) \lif ((q \lif r) \lif (p \lif r)).source

Exercises in K

Find derivations in K\Log{K}source for the following formulas:

  1. ¬p(pq)\Box \lnot p \lif \Box(p \lif q)source

  2. (pq)(pq)(\Box p \lor \Box q) \lif \Box(p \lor q)source

  3. p(pq)\Diamond p \lif \Diamond(p \lor q)source

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/derived-rules.tex

Derived Rules

Finding and writing derivations is obviously difficult, cumbersome, and repetitive. For instance, very often we want to pass from AB!A \lif !Bsource to AB\Box !A \lif \Box !Bsource, i.e., apply rule RK. That requires an application of Nec, then recording the proper instance of AxK, then applying MP. Passing from AB!A \lif !Bsource and BC!B \lif !Csource to AC!A \lif !Csource requires recording the (long) tautological instance

(AB)((BC)(AC))(!A \lif !B) \lif ((!B \lif !C) \lif (!A \lif !C))source

and applying MP twice. Often we want to replace a sub-formula by a formula we know to be equivalent, e.g., A\Diamond !Asource by ¬¬A\lnot\Box\lnot !Asource , or ¬¬A\lnot\lnot !Asource by A!Asource. So rather than write out the actual derivation, it is more convenient to simply record why the intermediate steps are derivable. For this purpose, let us collect some facts about derivability.

Propositional consequence may be used inside K

If KA1\Log{K} \Proves !A_1source, dots, KAn\Log{K} \Proves !A_nsource, and B!Bsource follows from A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource by propositional logic, then KB\Log{K} \Proves !Bsource.

Proof

If B!Bsource follows from A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource by propositional logic, then

A1(A2(AnB))!A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_n \lif !B)\dots)source

is a tautological instance. Applying MP nnsource times gives a derivation of B!Bsource.

We will indicate use of this proposition by PL.

Derived n-ary rule R K

If KA1(A2(An1An))\Log{K} \Proves !A_1 \lif (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_{n-1} \lif !A_n)\dots)source then KA1(A2(An1An))\Log{K} \Proves \Box !A_1 \lif (\Box !A_2 \lif \cdots (\Box !A_{n-1} \lif \Box !A_n)\dots)source.

Proof

By induction on nnsource, just as in the proof of the proposition that every normal modal logic is closed under rule R K.

We will indicate use of this proposition by RK. Let's illustrate how these results help establishing derivability results more easily.

Short proof of boxed conjunction

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves (\Box!A \land \Box!B) \lif \Box (!A \land !B)source

Proof

Three-line derived proof combining boxed conjuncts

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives formula A implies open parenthesis formula B implies open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: modal system K derives box formula A implies open parenthesis box formula B implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: rule R K. Line three: modal system K derives open parenthesis box formula A and box formula B close parenthesis implies box open parenthesis formula A and formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. KA(B(AB))\Log{K} \Proves !A \lif (!B \lif (!A \land !B))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. KA(B(AB)))\Log{K} \Proves \Box!A \lif (\Box !B \lif \Box(!A \land !B)))source Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves (\Box!A \land \Box!B) \lif \Box(!A \land !B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

source 66

Rewriting proposition

If KAB\Log{K} \Proves !A \liff !Bsource and KC[A/q]\Log{K} \Proves \Subst{!C}{!A}{q}source then KC[B/q]\Log{K} \Proves \Subst{!C}{B}{q}source

Proof

Exercise.

Exercise proving the rewriting proposition

Prove the rewriting proposition by proving, by induction on the complexity of C!Csource, that if KAB\Log{K} \Proves !A \liff !Bsource then KC[A/q]C[B/q]\Log{K} \Proves \Subst{!C}{!A}{q} \liff \Subst{!C}{!B}{q}source.

This proposition comes in handy especially when we want to convert \Diamondsource into \Boxsource (or vice versa), or remove double negations inside a formula. In what follows, we will mark applications of the rewriting proposition by “A!Asource for B!Bsource” whenever we re-write a formula C(B)!C(!B)source for C(A)!C(!A)source. In other words, “A!Asource for B!Bsource” abbreviates:

Three-line rewriting-rule abbreviation

Derivation. Unnumbered source line one: derives formula C open parenthesis formula A close parenthesis. Justification: no separate justification is printed. Unnumbered source line two: derives formula A if and only if formula B. Justification: no separate justification is printed. Unnumbered source line three: derives formula C open parenthesis formula B close parenthesis. Justification: the cited rewriting proposition. Source reference: the rewriting proposition. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. C(A)\Proves !C(!A)source Justification: no separate justification is printed. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. AB\Proves !A \liff !Bsource Justification: no separate justification is printed. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. C(B)\Proves !C(!B)source Justification: the cited rewriting proposition. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

References: the rewriting proposition.

source 94

For instance:

Not-box implies possible negation

K¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource

Proof

Three-line proof of not-box implying possible negation

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives diamond not propositional variable p if and only if not box not not propositional variable p. Justification: duality axiom. Line two: modal system K derives not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: propositional logic. Line three: modal system K derives not box propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: propositional variable p; then not not propositional variable p. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. K¬p¬¬¬p\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond \lnot p \liff \lnot\Box\lnot\lnot psource Justification: duality axiom. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. K¬¬¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psourceppsource¬¬p\lnot\lnot psource Justification: the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

source 107

In the above derivation, the final step “ppsource for ¬¬p\lnot\lnot psource” is short for

Expanded final rewriting step

Derivation. Unnumbered source line one: modal system K derives not box not not propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: no separate justification is printed. Unnumbered source line two: modal system K derives not not propositional variable p if and only if propositional variable p. Justification: tautological instance. Unnumbered source line three: modal system K derives not box propositional variable p implies diamond not propositional variable p. Justification: the cited rewriting proposition. Source reference: the rewriting proposition. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. K¬¬¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot \Box \lnot\lnot p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource Justification: no separate justification is printed. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. K¬¬pp\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\lnot p \liff psource Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource Justification: the cited rewriting proposition. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

References: the rewriting proposition.

source 126

The roles of C(q)!C(q)source, A!Asource, and B!Bsource in the rewriting proposition are played here, respectively, by ¬q¬p\lnot \Box q \lif \Diamond \lnot psource, ¬¬p\lnot\lnot psource, and ppsource.

When a formula contains a sub-formula ¬A\lnot\Diamond !Asource, we can replace it by ¬A\Box\lnot !Asource using the rewriting proposition, since K¬A¬A\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Diamond !A \liff \Box\lnot !Asource. We'll indicate this and similar replacements simply by “¬\Box\lnotsource for ¬\lnot\Diamondsource.”

The following proposition justifies that we can establish derivability results schematically. E.g., the previous proposition does not just establish that K¬p¬p\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box p \lif \Diamond \lnot psource, but K¬A¬A\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box !A \lif \Diamond \lnot !Asource for arbitrary A!Asource.

Uniform substitution preserves derivability

If A!Asource is a substitution instance of B!Bsource and KB\Log{K} \Proves !Bsource, then KA\Log{K} \Proves !Asource.

Proof

It is tedious but routine to verify (by induction on the length of the derivation of B!Bsource) that applying a substitution to an entire derivation also results in a correct derivation. Specifically, substitution instances of tautological instances are themselves tautological instances, substitution instances of instances of Dual and AxK are themselves instances of Dual and AxK, and applications of MP and Nec remain correct when substituting formulas for propositional variables in both premise(s) and conclusion.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/more-proofs-in-K.tex

More Proofs in LogK

Let's see some more examples of derivability in LogK, now using the simplified method introduced in the section on derived rules.

Boxed implication preserves possibility

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Box (!A \lif !B) \lif (\Diamond !A \lif \Diamond !B)source

Proof

Five-line proof that box preserves diamond implication

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not formula B implies not formula A close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line two: modal system K derives box open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box not formula B implies box not formula A close parenthesis. Justification: rule R K. Line three: modal system K derives open parenthesis box not formula B implies box not formula A close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not box not formula A implies not box not formula B close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line four: modal system K derives box open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not box not formula A implies not box not formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line five: modal system K derives box open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis diamond formula A implies diamond formula B close parenthesis. Justification: the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: diamond; then not box not. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. K(AB)(¬B¬A)\Log{K} \Proves (!A \lif !B) \lif (\lnot !B \lif \lnot !A)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. K(AB)(¬B¬A)\Log{K} \Proves \Box(!A \lif !B) \lif (\Box\lnot!B \lif \Box\lnot!A)source Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K(¬B¬A)(¬¬A¬¬B)\Log{K} \Proves (\Box\lnot!B \lif \Box\lnot!A) \lif (\lnot \Box\lnot!A \lif \lnot\Box\lnot!B)source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. K(AB)(¬¬A¬¬B)\Log{K} \Proves \Box(!A \lif !B) \lif (\lnot \Box\lnot!A \lif \lnot\Box\lnot!B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2, line-3. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Box(!A \lif !B) \lif (\Diamond!A \lif \Diamond!B)source\Diamondsource¬¬\lnot\Box\lnotsource Justification: the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

source 22

A boxed antecedent and possible conditional yield a possible consequent

KA((AB)B)\Log{K}\Proves \Box!A \lif (\Diamond(!A \lif !B) \lif \Diamond !B)source

Proof

Four-line mixed box-and-diamond implication proof

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives formula A implies open parenthesis not formula B implies not open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: modal system K derives box formula A implies open parenthesis box not formula B implies box not open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: rule R K. Line three: modal system K derives box formula A implies open parenthesis not box not open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies not box not formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line four: modal system K derives box formula A implies open parenthesis diamond open parenthesis formula A implies formula B close parenthesis implies diamond formula B close parenthesis. Justification: the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: diamond; then not box not. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. KA(¬B¬(AB))\Log{K} \Proves !A \lif (\lnot!B \lif \lnot (!A \lif !B))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. KA(¬B¬(AB))\Log{K} \Proves \Box!A \lif (\Box\lnot!B \lif \Box\lnot (!A\lif !B))source Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. KA(¬¬(AB)¬¬B)\Log{K} \Proves \Box!A \lif (\lnot \Box\lnot (!A\lif !B) \lif \lnot \Box\lnot!B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. KA((AB)B)\Log{K} \Proves \Box!A \lif (\Diamond(!A \lif !B) \lif \Diamond !B)source\Diamondsource¬¬\lnot\Box\lnotsource Justification: the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

source 39

Either possible disjunct makes the disjunction possible

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves (\Diamond!A \lor \Diamond!B) \lif \Diamond(!A \lor !B)source

Proof

Six-line proof that possibility is monotone over disjunction

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies not formula A. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: modal system K derives box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies box not formula A. Justification: rule R K. Line three: modal system K derives not box not formula A implies not box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line four: modal system K derives diamond formula A implies diamond open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis. Justification: the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: diamond; then not box not. Line five: modal system K derives diamond formula B implies diamond open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis. Justification: the analogous preceding argument. Line six: modal system K derives open parenthesis diamond formula A or diamond formula B close parenthesis implies diamond open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. K¬(AB)¬A\Log{K} \Proves \lnot(!A \lor !B) \lif \lnot!Asource Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. K¬(AB)¬A\Log{K} \Proves \Box\lnot(!A \lor !B) \lif \Box\lnot!Asource Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-1. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K¬¬A¬¬(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \lnot\Box\lnot !A \lif \lnot\Box\lnot(!A \lor!B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. KA(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond!A \lif \Diamond(!A \lor !B)source\Diamondsource¬¬\lnot\Box\lnotsource Justification: the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. KB(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond!B \lif \Diamond(!A \lor !B)source Justification: the analogous preceding argument. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  6. Line 6. K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves (\Diamond!A \lor\Diamond!B) \lif \Diamond(!A \lor !B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-4, line-5. Discharges: none.

source 55

Possibility distributes over disjunction

K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond(!A \lor!B) \lif (\Diamond!A \lor \Diamond!B)source

Proof

Seven-line proof that possibility distributes over disjunction

Derivation. Line one: modal system K derives not formula A implies open parenthesis not formula B implies not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: tautological instance. Line two: modal system K derives box not formula A implies open parenthesis box not formula B implies box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis close parenthesis. Justification: rule R K. Line three: modal system K derives box not formula A implies open parenthesis not box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies not box not formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line four: modal system K derives not box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis box not formula A implies not box not formula B close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line five: modal system K derives not box not open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not not box not formula B implies not box not formula A close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. Line six: modal system K derives diamond open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis not diamond formula B implies diamond formula A close parenthesis. Justification: the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: diamond; then not box not. Line seven: modal system K derives diamond open parenthesis formula A or formula B close parenthesis implies open parenthesis diamond formula B or diamond formula A close parenthesis. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

  1. Line 1. K¬A(¬B¬(AB))\Log{K} \Proves \lnot !A \lif (\lnot !B \lif \lnot (!A \lor !B))source Justification: tautological instance. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  2. Line 2. K¬A(¬B¬(AB))\Log{K} \Proves \Box\lnot !A \lif (\Box\lnot!B \lif \Box \lnot (!A \lor !B))source Justification: rule R K. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  3. Line 3. K¬A(¬¬(AB)¬¬B)\Log{K} \Proves \Box\lnot !A \lif (\lnot \Box \lnot (!A \lor!B) \lif \lnot\Box\lnot !B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

  4. Line 4. K¬¬(AB)(¬A¬¬B)\Log{K} \Proves \lnot \Box \lnot(!A \lor !B) \lif (\Box \lnot !A \lif \lnot\Box\lnot !B)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-3. Discharges: none.

  5. Line 5. K¬¬(AB)(¬¬¬B¬¬A)\Log{K} \Proves \lnot \Box \lnot(!A\lor!B) \lif (\lnot \lnot\Box\lnot!B \lif \lnot\Box\lnot!A)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-4. Discharges: none.

  6. Line 6. K(AB)(¬BA)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond(!A \lor !B) \lif (\lnot \Diamond!B \lif \Diamond!A)source\Diamondsource¬¬\lnot\Box\lnotsource Justification: the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

  7. Line 7. K(AB)(BA)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond(!A\lor!B) \lif (\Diamond!B \lor \Diamond!A)source Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-6. Discharges: none.

source 73

Exercises on derived K proofs

Show that the following derivability claims hold:

  1. K¬(AA)\Log{K} \Proves \Diamond \lnot \lfalse \lif (\Box !A \lif \Diamond !A)source;

  2. K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves \Box(!A \lor !B) \lif (\Diamond !A \lor \Box !B)source;

  3. K(AB)(AB)\Log{K} \Proves (\Diamond !A \lif \Box !B) \lif \Box(!A \lif !B)source.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/duals.tex

Dual formula

Definition of the dual modal schemata

Each of the formulas AxT, AxB, Ax4, and Ax5 has a dual, denoted by a subscripted diamond, as follows:

row label Tpprow label Bpprow label 4pprow label 5pp\tag{\Ax{T_\Diamond}} p & \lif \Diamond p\\ \tag{\Ax{B_\Diamond}} \Diamond\Box p & \lif p\\ \tag{\Ax{4_\Diamond}} \Diamond\Diamond p & \lif \Diamond p\\ \tag{\Ax{5_\Diamond}} \Diamond\Box p & \lif \Box psource

Each of the above dual formulas is obtained from the corresponding formula by substituting ¬p\lnot psource for ppsource, contraposing, replacing ¬¬\lnot\Box\lnotsource by \Diamondsource, and replacing ¬¬\lnot\Diamond\lnotsource by \Boxsource. AxD, i.e., AA\Box!A \lif \Diamond!Asource is its own dual in that sense.

A modal schema and its dual generate the same system

For each formula A!Asource in the definition of the dual modal schemata: KA=KA\Log{K}!A = \Log{K}!A_{\Diamond}source.

Proof

Exercise.

Exercise on dual modal systems

Prove the proposition that adjoining a schema or its dual gives the same modal system.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/proofs-modal-systems.tex

Proofs in Modal Systems

We now come to proofs in systems of modal logic other than LogK.

Six derivability facts among modal systems

The following provability results obtain:

  1. KT5B\Log{KT5} \Proves \Ax{B}source;

  2. KT54\Log{KT5} \Proves \Ax{4}source;

  3. KDB4T\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Ax{T}source;

  4. KB45\Log{KB4} \Proves \Ax{5}source;

  5. KB54\Log{KB5} \Proves \Ax{4}source;

  6. KTD\Log{KT} \Proves \Ax{D}source.

Proof

We exhibit proofs for each.

  1. KT5B\Log{KT5} \Proves \Ax{B}source:

    Three-line K T five proof of axiom B

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K T five derives diamond formula A implies box diamond formula A. Justification: axiom five. Line two: modal system K T five derives formula A implies diamond formula A. Justification: axiom T subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom T subscript diamond. Line three: modal system K T five derives formula A implies box diamond formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Diamond!A \lif \Box\Diamond!Asource Justification: axiom five. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves !A \lif \Diamond!AsourceT\Ax{T_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom T subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves !A \lif \Box\Diamond!Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2, line-1. Discharges: none.

    source 31
  2. KT54\Log{KT5} \Proves \Ax{4}source:

    Six-line K T five proof of axiom four

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K T five derives diamond box formula A implies box diamond box formula A. Justification: axiom five; the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: box formula A; then propositional variable p. Line two: modal system K T five derives box formula A implies diamond box formula A. Justification: axiom T subscript diamond; the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: axiom T subscript diamond; then box formula A; then propositional variable p. Line three: modal system K T five derives box formula A implies box diamond box formula A. Justification: propositional logic. Line four: modal system K T five derives diamond box formula A implies box formula A. Justification: axiom five subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom five subscript diamond. Line five: modal system K T five derives box diamond box formula A implies box box formula A. Justification: rule R K. Line six: modal system K T five derives box formula A implies box box formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Diamond\Box!A \lif \Box\Diamond\Box!AsourceA\Box!Asourceppsource Justification: axiom five; the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Diamond\Box!AsourceT\Ax{T_\Diamond}sourceA\Box!Asourceppsource Justification: axiom T subscript diamond; the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box\Diamond\Box!Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-2, line-1. Discharges: none.

    4. Line 4. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Diamond\Box!A \lif \Box!Asource5\Ax{5_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom five subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    5. Line 5. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Box\Diamond\Box!A \lif \Box\Box!Asource Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-4. Discharges: none.

    6. Line 6. KT5AA\Log{KT5} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box\Box!Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-3, line-5. Discharges: none.

    source 37
  3. KDB4T\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Ax{T}source:

    Five-line K D B four proof of axiom T

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K D B four derives diamond box formula A implies formula A. Justification: axiom B subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom B subscript diamond. Line two: modal system K D B four derives box box formula A implies diamond box formula A. Justification: axiom D; the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: axiom D; then box formula A; then propositional variable p. Line three: modal system K D B four derives box box formula A implies formula A. Justification: propositional logic. Line four: modal system K D B four derives box formula A implies box box formula A. Justification: axiom four. Line five: modal system K D B four derives box formula A implies formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KDB4AA\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Diamond\Box!A \lif !AsourceB\Ax{B_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom B subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KDB4AA\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Box\Box!A \lif \Diamond\Box!AsourceD\Ax{D}sourceA\Box!Asourceppsource Justification: axiom D; the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KDB4AA\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Box\Box!A \lif !Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-1, line-2. Discharges: none.

    4. Line 4. KDB4AA\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box\Box!Asource Justification: axiom four. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    5. Line 5. KDB4AA\Log{KDB4} \Proves \Box!A \lif !Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-4, line-3. Discharges: none.

    source 48
  4. KB45\Log{KB4} \Proves \Ax{5}source:

    Four-line K B four proof of axiom five

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K B four derives diamond formula A implies box diamond diamond formula A. Justification: axiom B; the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: diamond formula A; then propositional variable p. Line two: modal system K B four derives diamond diamond formula A implies diamond formula A. Justification: axiom four subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom four subscript diamond. Line three: modal system K B four derives box diamond diamond formula A implies box diamond formula A. Justification: rule R K. Line four: modal system K B four derives diamond formula A implies box diamond formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KB4AA\Log{KB4} \Proves \Diamond!A \lif \Box \Diamond\Diamond!AsourceA\Diamond!Asourceppsource Justification: axiom B; the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KB4AA\Log{KB4} \Proves \Diamond\Diamond !A \lif \Diamond !Asource4\Ax{4_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom four subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KB4AA\Log{KB4} \Proves \Box\Diamond\Diamond !A \lif \Box \Diamond!Asource Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

    4. Line 4. KB4AA\Log{KB4} \Proves \Diamond!A \lif \Box\Diamond!Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-1, line-3. Discharges: none.

    source 57
  5. KB54\Log{KB5} \Proves \Ax{4}source:

    Four-line K B five proof of axiom four

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K B five derives box formula A implies box diamond box formula A. Justification: axiom B; the source-listed replacement. Source justification formulas, in order: box formula A; then propositional variable p. Line two: modal system K B five derives diamond box formula A implies box formula A. Justification: axiom five subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom five subscript diamond. Line three: modal system K B five derives box diamond box formula A implies box box formula A. Justification: rule R K. Line four: modal system K B five derives box formula A implies box box formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KB5AA\Log{KB5} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box\Diamond\Box !AsourceA\Box!Asourceppsource Justification: axiom B; the source-listed replacement. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KB5AA\Log{KB5} \Proves \Diamond\Box!A \lif \Box !Asource5\Ax{5_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom five subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KB5AA\Log{KB5} \Proves \Box\Diamond\Box!A \lif \Box\Box !Asource Justification: rule R K. Depends on: line-2. Discharges: none.

    4. Line 4. KB5AA\Log{KB5} \Proves \Box!A \lif \Box\Box!Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-1, line-3. Discharges: none.

    source 67
  6. KTD\Log{KT} \Proves \Ax{D}source:

    Three-line K T proof of axiom D

    Derivation. Line one: modal system K T derives box formula A implies formula A. Justification: axiom T. Line two: modal system K T derives formula A implies diamond formula A. Justification: axiom T subscript diamond. Source justification formula, in order: axiom T subscript diamond. Line three: modal system K T derives box formula A implies diamond formula A. Justification: propositional logic. End derivation.

    1. Line 1. KTAA\Log{KT} \Proves \Box !A \lif !Asource Justification: axiom T. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    2. Line 2. KTAA\Log{KT} \Proves !A \lif \Diamond!AsourceT\Ax{T_\Diamond}source Justification: axiom T subscript diamond. Depends on: none. Discharges: none.

    3. Line 3. KTAA\Log{KT} \Proves \Box !A \lif \Diamond !Asource Justification: propositional logic. Depends on: line-1, line-2. Discharges: none.

    source 76

Definitions of S four and S five

Following tradition, we define LogS4 to be the system LogKT4, and LogS5 the system LogKTB4.

The following proposition shows that the classical system LogS5 has several equivalent axiomatizations. This should not surprise, as the various combinations of axioms all characterize equivalence relations (see the proposition characterizing equivalence relations).

Equivalent axiomatizations of S five

KTB4=KT5=KDB4=KDB5\Log{KTB4} = \Log{KT5} = \Log{KDB4} = \Log{KDB5}source.

Proof

Exercise.

Exercise proving the S-five equivalences

Prove the proposition giving equivalent axiomatizations of S five.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/soundness.tex

Soundness

A derivation system is called sound if everything that can be derived is valid. When considering modal systems, i.e., derivations where in addition to AxK we can use instances of some formulas A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource, we want every derivable formula to be true in any model in which A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource are true.

Soundness theorem for modal systems

[Soundness Theorem] If every instance of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource is valid in the classes of models C1\mClass{C}_1source, dots, Cn\mClass{C}_nsource, respectively, then KA1AnB\Log{K}!A_1\dots !A_n \Proves !Bsource implies that B!Bsource is valid in the class of models C1Cn\mClass{C}_1 \cap \dots \cap \mClass{C}_nsource.

Proof

By induction on length of proofs. For brevity, put C=C1Cn\mClass{C} = \mClass{C}_1 \cap \dots \cap \mClass{C}_nsource.

  1. Induction Basis: If B!Bsource has a proof of length 11source, then it is either a tautological instance, an instance of AxK, or of Dual, or an instance of one of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource. In the first case, B!Bsource is valid in C\mClass{C}source, since tautological instance are valid in any class of models, by the proposition that tautological instances are valid. Similarly in the second case, by the proposition that axiom K is valid and the proposition that the duality schema is valid . Finally in the third case, since B!Bsource is valid in Ci\mClass{C}_isource and CCi\mClass{C} \subseteq \mClass{C}_isource, we have that B!Bsource is valid in C\mClass{C}source as well by the proposition preserving validity under subclasses of models.

  2. Inductive step: Suppose B!Bsource has a proof of length k>1k>1source. If B!Bsource is a tautological instance or an instance of one of A1!A_1source, dots, An!A_nsource, we proceed as in the previous step. So suppose B!Bsource is obtained by MP from previous formulas CB!C \lif !Bsource and C!Csource. Then CB!C \lif !Bsource and C!Csource have proofs of length <k<ksource, and by inductive hypothesis they are valid in C\mClass{C}source. By the soundness of modus ponens, B!Bsource is valid in C\mClass{C}source as well. Finally suppose B!Bsource is obtained by Nec from C!Csource (so that B=C!B = \Box!Csource). By inductive hypothesis, C!Csource is valid in C\mClass{C}source, and by the validity-preservation rule for necessitation so is B!Bsource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/systems-distinct.tex

Showing Systems are Distinct

In the section on proofs in modal systems we saw how to prove that two systems of modal logic are in fact the same system. the soundness theorem for modal systems allows us to show that two modal systems Σ\Sigmasource and Σ\Sigma'source are distinct, by finding a formula A!Asource such that ΣA\Sigma' \Proves !Asource that fails in a model of Σ\Sigmasource.

K D is a proper subsystem of K T

KDKT\Log{KD} \subsetneq \Log{KT}source

Proof

This is the syntactic counterpart to the semantic fact that all reflexive relations are serial. To show KDKT\Log{KD} \subseteq \Log{KT}source we need to see that KDB\Log{KD} \Proves !Bsource implies KTB\Log{KT} \Proves !Bsource, which follows from KTD\Log{KT} \Proves \Log{D}source, as shown in the proposition listing modal-system derivability factsthe item stating that K T derives axiom D. To show that the inclusion is proper, by Soundness (the soundness theorem for modal systems), it suffices to exhibit a model of LogKD where AxT, i.e., pp\Box p \lif psource, fails (an easy task left as an exercise), for then by Soundness KDpp\Log{KD} \Proves/ \Box p \lif psource.

K B differs from K four

KBK4\Log{KB} \neq \Log{K4}source.

Proof

We construct a symmetric model where some instance of Ax4 fails; since obviously the instance is derivable for LogK4 but not in LogKB, it will follow K4KB\Log{K4} \nsubseteq \Log{KB}source. Consider the symmetric model M\mModel{M}source of the symmetric countermodel to axiom four. Since the model is symmetric, AxK and AxB are true in M\mModel{M}source (by the proposition that axiom K is valid and the theorem connecting modal schemata with accessibility conditions, respectively). However, Mpp[w1]\mSat/{M}{\Box p \lif \Box\Box p}[w_1]source.

Figure: symmetric countermodel to axiom four

The figure contains the complete two-world directed graph and its printed valuation and modal-truth annotations. The nested graph structure supplies every node and arrow.

Source transcription

[htpb] centering

Two-world symmetric countermodel to axiom four

Model graph. World w subscript one has valuation propositional variable p is printed false at this world. Its printed claims are the displayed model satisfies box propositional variable p at every world and the displayed model does not satisfy box box propositional variable p at every world. World w subscript two has valuation propositional variable p is printed true at this world. Its printed claim is the displayed model does not satisfy box propositional variable p at every world. There is one directed arrow from w one to w two and one from w two to w one; no loops or other arrows are printed. End model graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: world w subscript one¬p\mFalse{p}sourcep\mSat{{}}{\Box p}sourcep\mSat/{{}}{\Box\Box p}sourcew1w_1source
  2. Node 2: world w subscript twop\mTrue{p}sourcep\mSat/{{}}{\Box p}sourcew2w_2source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w1 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript one to world w subscript two.
  2. Edge 2: w2 to w1; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript two to world w subscript one.
source 53

captionA symmetric model falsifying an instance of Ax4.

K T B derives neither four nor five

KTB4\Log{KTB} \Proves/ \Log{4}source and KTB5\Log{KTB} \Proves/ \Log{5}source.

Proof

By the theorem connecting modal schemata with accessibility conditions we know that all instances of AxT and AxB are true in every reflexive symmetric model (respectively). So by soundness, it suffices to find a reflexive symmetric model containing a world at which some instance of Ax4 fails, and similarly for Ax5. We use the same model for both claims. Consider the symmetric, reflexive model in the reflexive symmetric countermodel to axioms four and five. Then Mpp[w1]\mSat/{M}{\Box p \to \Box \Box p}[w_1]source, so Ax4 fails at w1w_1source. Similarly, M¬p¬p[w2]\mSat/{M}{\Diamond \lnot p \lif \Box \Diamond \lnot p}[w_2]source, so the instance of Ax5 with A=¬p!A = \lnot psource fails at w2w_2source.

Figure: reflexive symmetric countermodel to four and five

The figure contains three worlds, a reflexive loop at each, four cross-world arrows, valuations, and all printed modal claims.

Source transcription

[htpb] centering

Three-world reflexive symmetric countermodel to axioms four and five

Model graph. World w subscript one has valuation propositional variable p is printed true at this world. Its printed claims, in order, are the displayed model satisfies box propositional variable p at every world, the displayed model does not satisfy box box propositional variable p at every world, and the displayed model does not satisfy diamond not propositional variable p at every world. World w subscript two has valuation propositional variable p is printed true at this world. Its claims are the displayed model satisfies diamond not propositional variable p at every world and the displayed model does not satisfy box diamond not propositional variable p at every world. World w subscript three has valuation propositional variable p is printed false at this world. Each world has a reflexive loop. The remaining arrows are w one to w two, w two to w three, w three to w two, and w two to w one. End model graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: world w subscript onep\mTrue{p}sourcep\mSat{{}}{\Box p}sourcep\mSat/{{}}{\Box\Box p}source¬p\mSat/{{}}{\Diamond\lnot p}sourcew1w_1source
  2. Node 2: world w subscript twop\mTrue{p}source¬p\mSat{{}}{\Diamond\lnot p}source¬p\mSat/{{}}{\Box\Diamond\lnot p}sourcew2w_2source
  3. Node 3: world w subscript three¬p\mFalse{p}sourcew3w_3source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w1 to w1; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  2. Edge 2: w2 to w2; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  3. Edge 3: w3 to w3; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  4. Edge 4: w1 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript one to world w subscript two.
  5. Edge 5: w2 to w3; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript two to world w subscript three.
  6. Edge 6: w3 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript three to world w subscript two.
  7. Edge 7: w2 to w1; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript two to world w subscript one.
source 84

captionThe model for the theorem that K T B derives neither axiom four nor axiom five.

K D five differs from S four

KD5KT4=S4\Log{KD5} \neq \Log{KT4} = \Log{S4}source.

Proof

By the theorem connecting modal schemata with accessibility conditions we know that all instances of AxD and Ax5 are true in all serial euclidean models. So it suffices to find a serial euclidean model containing a world at which some instance of Ax4 fails. Consider the model of the serial Euclidean countermodel to axiom four, and notice that Mpp[w1]\mSat/{M}{\Box p \lif \Box\Box p}[w_1]source.

Figure: serial Euclidean countermodel to axiom four

The figure contains four worlds, three reflexive loops, eight directed cross-world arrows, valuations, and the printed box and double-box claims at w one.

Source transcription

[t] centering

Four-world serial Euclidean countermodel to axiom four

Model graph. World w subscript two has valuation propositional variable p is printed true at this world. World w subscript one has valuation propositional variable p is printed false at this world and carries the two printed claims the displayed model satisfies box propositional variable p at every world comma the displayed model does not satisfy box box propositional variable p at every world. World w subscript three has valuation propositional variable p is printed true at this world. World w subscript four has valuation propositional variable p is printed false at this world. Worlds w two, w three, and w four each have a reflexive loop and arrows in both directions between every distinct pair among them. World w one has arrows to w two and w three only. No other arrows are printed. End model graph.

Nodes

  1. Node 1: world w subscript twop\mTrue{p}sourcew2w_2source
  2. Node 2: world w subscript one¬p\mFalse{p}sourcep,p\mSat{{}}{\Box p}, \mSat/{{}}{\Box\Box p}sourcew1w_1source
  3. Node 3: world w subscript threep\mTrue{p}sourcew3w_3source
  4. Node 4: world w subscript four¬p\mFalse{p}sourcew4w_4source

Edges

  1. Edge 1: w2 to w2; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  2. Edge 2: w3 to w3; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  3. Edge 3: w4 to w4; a reflexive accessibility loop; loop.
  4. Edge 4: w1 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript one to world w subscript two.
  5. Edge 5: w1 to w3; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript one to world w subscript three.
  6. Edge 6: w2 to w3; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript two to world w subscript three.
  7. Edge 7: w3 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript three to world w subscript two.
  8. Edge 8: w2 to w4; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript two to world w subscript four.
  9. Edge 9: w4 to w2; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript four to world w subscript two.
  10. Edge 10: w3 to w4; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript three to world w subscript four.
  11. Edge 11: w4 to w3; a directed accessibility arrow from world w subscript four to world w subscript three.
source 120

captionThe model for the theorem distinguishing K D five from S four.

Exercise seeking a three-world countermodel

Give an alternative proof of the theorem distinguishing K D five from S four using a model with 33source worlds.

Exercise seeking one S-four countermodel to B and five

Provide a single reflexive transitive model showing that both KT4B\Log{KT4} \Proves/ \Ax{B}source and KT45\Log{KT4} \Proves/ \Ax{5}source.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/provability-from-set.tex

derivability from a Set of formula

In the section on proofs in modal systems we defined a notion of provability of a formula in a system Σ\Sigmasource. We now extend this notion to provability in Σ\Sigmasource from formulas in a set Γ\Gammasource.

Definition of derivability from a set

A formula A!Asource is derivable in a system Σ\Sigmasource from a set of formulas Γ\Gammasource, written ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource if and only if there are B1!B_1source, dots, BnΓ!B_n \in \Gammasource such that ΣB1(B2(BnA))\Sigma \Proves !B_1 \lif (!B_2 \lif \cdots (!B_n \lif !A) \cdots)source.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/provability-properties.tex

Properties of derivability

Five properties of derivability from a set

Let Σ\Sigmasource be a modal system and Γ\Gammasource a set of modal formulas. The following properties hold:

  1. Monotonicity: If ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource and ΓΔ\Gamma \subseteq \Deltasource then ΔΣA\Delta \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource;

  2. Reflexivity: If AΓ!A \in \Gammasource then ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource;

  3. Cut: If ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource and Δ{A}ΣB\Delta \cup \{!A\} \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource then ΓΔΣB\Gamma \cup \Delta \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource;

  4. Deduction theorem: Γ{B}ΣA\Gamma \cup \{!B\} \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource if and only if ΓΣBA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !B \lif !Asource;

  5. ΓΣA1\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !A_1source and dots and ΓΣAn\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !A_nsource and A1(A2(AnB))!A_1 \to (!A_2 \lif \cdots (!A_n \lif !B)\cdots)source is a tautological instance, then ΓΣB\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource.

The proof is an easy exercise. Part the rule-T item among the derivability properties of the proposition listing derivability properties gives us that, for instance, if ΓΣAB\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !A \lor !Bsource and ΓΣ¬A\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \lnot !Asource, then ΓΣB\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource. Also, in what follows, we write Γ,AΣB\Gamma, !A \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource instead of Γ{A}ΣB\Gamma \cup \{ !A\} \Proves[\Sigma] !Bsource.

Definition of deductive closure

A set Γ\Gammasource is deductively closed relatively to a system Σ\Sigmasource if and only if ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource implies AΓ!A \in \Gammasource.

Source file content/normal-modal-logic/axioms-systems/consistency.tex

Consistency

Consistency is an important property of sets of formulas. A set of formulas is inconsistent if a contradiction, such as \lfalsesource, is derivable from it; and otherwise consistent. If a set is inconsistent, its formulas cannot all be true in a model at a world. For the completeness theorem we prove the converse: every consistent set is true at a world in a model, namely in the “canonical model.”

Definition of relative consistency

A set Γ\Gammasource is consistent relatively to a system Σ\Sigmasource or, as we will say, Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, if and only if ΓΣ\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] \lfalsesource.

So for instance, the set {(pq),p,¬q}\{ \Box(p \lif q), \Box p, \lnot\Box q \}source is consistent relatively to propositional logic, but not LogK-consistent. Similarly, the set {p,pq,¬q}\{ \Diamond p, \Box\Diamond p \lif q, \lnot q \}source is not LogK5-consistent.

Three consistency facts

Let Γ\Gammasource be a set of formulas. Then:

  1. Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent if and only if there is some formula A!Asource such that ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves/[\Sigma] !Asource.

  2. ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !Asource if and only if Γ{¬A}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \}source is not Σ\Sigmasource-consistent.

  3. If Γ\Gammasource is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent, then for any formula A!Asource, either Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{ !A \}source is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent or Γ{¬A}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \}source is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent.

Proof

These facts follow easily using classical propositional logic. We give the argument for the consistency-extension item. Proceed contrapositively and suppose neither Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{ !A \}source nor Γ{¬A}\Gamma \cup \{ \lnot!A \}source is Σ\Sigmasource-consistent. Then by the consistency characterization by adjoining a negation, both Γ,AΣ\Gamma, !A \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource and Γ,¬AΣ\Gamma, \lnot !A \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource. By the deduction theorem ΓΣA\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] !A \to \lfalsesource and ΓΣ¬A\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \lnot!A \lif \lfalsesource. But (A)((¬A))(!A \lif \lfalse) \lif ((\lnot!A \lif \lfalse) \lif \lfalse)source is a tautological instance, hence by the proposition listing derivability propertiesthe rule-T item among the derivability properties, ΓΣ\Gamma \Proves[\Sigma] \lfalsesource.

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