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Hilbert's Hotel

The set of the natural numbers is obviously infinite. So, if we do not want to help ourselves to the natural numbers, our first step must characterize an infinite set in terms that do not require mentioning the natural numbers themselves. Here is a nice approach, presented by Hilbert in a lecture from 1924. He asks us to imagine

[…] a hotel with a finite number of rooms. All of these rooms should be occupied by exactly one guest. If the guests now swap their rooms somehow, [but] so that each room still contains no more than one person, then no rooms will become free, and the hotel-owner cannot in this way create a new place for a newly arriving guest […]

Now we stipulate that the hotel shall have infinitely many numbered rooms 1source 26, 2source 26, 3source 26, 4source 26, 5source 26, …, each of which is occupied by exactly one guest. As soon as a new guest comes along, the owner only needs to move each of the old guests into the room associated with the number one higher, and room 1source 29 will be free for the newly-arriving guest.

Hilbert's Hotel room-shift diagram

Nine numbered guests are shown moving from room n to room n plus one, leaving room one empty; ellipses indicate the infinite continuation.

Hilbert's Hotel room-shift diagramNine numbered guests are shown moving from room n to room n plus one, leaving room one empty; ellipses indicate the infinite continuation.112233445566778899

source 32

(published in David Hilbert 2013, 730; our translation)

The crucial point is that Hilbert's Hotel has infinitely many rooms; and we can take his explanation to define what it means to say this. Indeed, this was Dedekind's approach (presented here, of course, with massive anachronism; Dedekind's definition is from 1888):

Definition of a Dedekind-infinite set

A set Asource 61 is Dedekind infinite iff there is an injection from Asource 62 to a proper subset of Asource 62. That is, there is some oAsource 62 and an injection f:AAsource 63 such that oran(f)source 63.

source 60

Dedekind Algebras

We not only want natural numbers to be infinite; we want them to have certain (algebraic) properties: they need to behave well under addition, multiplication, and so forth.

Dedekind's idea was to take the idea of the successor function as basic, and then characterise the numbers as those with the following properties:

  1. There is a number, 0source 20, which is not the successor of any number i.e., 0ran(s)source 21 i.e., xs(x)0source 22

  2. Distinct numbers have distinct successors i.e., ssource 24 is an injection i.e., xy(s(x)=s(y)x=y)source 25

  3. Every number is obtained from 0source 27 by repeated applications of the successor function.

The first two conditions are easy to deal with using first-order logic (see above). But we cannot deal with condition three, repeated application of the successor function just using first-order logic. Dedekind's breakthrough was to reformulate condition three, repeated application of the successor function, set-theoretically, as follows:

  1. 3 'source 34.

    The natural numbers are the smallest set that is closed under the successor function: that is, if we apply ssource 36 to any element of the set, we obtain another element of the set.

But we shall need to spell this out slowly.

Definition of closure under a function

For any function fsource 42, the set Xsource 42 is fsource 42-closed iff (xX)f(x)Xsource 43. Now define, for any osource 43: clof(o)={X:oX and X is f-closed}source 44

source 41

So clof(o)source 48 is the intersection of all the fsource 48-closed sets with osource 49 as an element. Intuitively, then, clof(o)source 50 is the smallest fsource 50-closed set with osource 50 as an element. This next result makes that intuitive thought precise;

Lemma on closure properties

For any function fsource 54 and any oAsource 54:

  1. oclof(o)source 56; and

  2. clof(o)source 57 is fsource 57-closed; and

  3. if Xsource 58 is fsource 58-closed and oXsource 58, then clof(o)Xsource 59

source 53

Proof

Note that there is at least one fsource 64-closed set with osource 64 as an element, namely ran(f){o}source 64. So clof(o)source 65, the intersection of all such sets, exists. We must now check the closure-contains-o clausethe least-closure clause.

Concerning the closure-contains-o clause: oclof(o)source 69 as it is an intersection of sets which all have osource 70 as an element.

Concerning the closure-is-f-closed clause: suppose xclof(o)source 72. So if oXsource 72 and Xsource 72 is fsource 72-closed, then xXsource 72, and now f(x)Xsource 72 as Xsource 72 is fsource 73-closed. So f(x)clof(o)source 73.

Concerning the least-closure clause: quite generally, if XCsource 75 then CXsource 76.

End of proof.

Using this, we can say:

Definition of a Dedekind algebra

A Dedekind algebra is a set Asource 82 together with a function f:AAsource 82 and some oAsource 83 such that:

  1. oran(f)source 85

  2. fsource 86 is an injection

  3. A=clof(o)source 87

source 81

Since A=clof(o)source 91, our earlier result tells us that Asource 92 is the smallest fsource 92-closed set with osource 92 as an element. Clearly a Dedekind algebra is Dedekind infinite; just look at clauses placing o outside the range and requiring f to be injective of the definition. But the more exciting fact is that any Dedekind infinite set can be turned into a Dedekind algebra.

Theorem producing a Dedekind algebra

If there is a Dedekind infinite set, then there is a Dedekind algebra.

source 98

Proof

Let Dsource 103 be Dedekind infinite. So there is an injection g:DDsource 103 and an element oDran(g)source 104. Now let A=clog(o)source 104; by the lemma on closure properties, Asource 105 exists and oAsource 105. Let f=gAsource 105. We will show that A,f,osource 106 comprise a Dedekind algebra.

Concerning the clause placing o outside the range: oran(g)source 109 and ran(f)ran(g)source 109 so oran(f)source 110.

Concerning the injection clause: gsource 112 is an injection on Dsource 112; so fgsource 112 must be an injection.

Concerning the closure-generates-A clause: by the lemma on closure properties, Asource 115 is gsource 115-closed; a fortiori, Asource 115 is fsource 115-closed. So clof(o)Asource 115 by the lemma on closure properties. Since also clof(o)source 115 is fsource 115-closed and f=gAsource 115, it follows that clof(o)source 115 is gsource 115-closed. So Aclof(o)source 115 by the lemma on closure properties.

End of proof.

Dedekind Algebras and Arithmetical Induction

Crucially, now, a Dedekind algebra—indeed, any Dedekind algebra—will serve as a surrogate for the natural numbers. This is thanks to the following trivial consequence:

Arithmetical induction theorem for Dedekind algebras

Let N,s,osource 17 comprise a Dedekind algebra. Then for any set Xsource 17:

if oXsource 19 and (nNX)s(n)Xsource 19, then NXsource 19.

source 16

Proof

By the definition of a Dedekind algebra, N=clos(o)source 24. Now if both oXsource 25 and (nN)(nXs(n)X)source 25, then N=clos(o)Xsource 26.

End of proof.

Since induction is characteristic of the natural numbers, the point is this. Given any Dedekind infinite set, we can form a Dedekind algebra, and use that algebra as our surrogate for the natural numbers.

Admittedly, the arithmetical induction theorem formulates induction in set-theoretic terms. But we can easily put the principle in terms which might be more familiar:

Formula induction schema for Dedekind algebras

Let N,s,osource 38 comprise a Dedekind algebra. Then for any formula φ(x)source 39, which may have parameters:

if φ(o)source 41 and (nN)(φ(n)φ(s(n)))source 41, then (nN)φ(n)source 42

source 37

Proof

Let X={nN:φ(n)}source 47, and now use the arithmetical induction theorem

End of proof.

In this result, we spoke of a formula “having parameters”. What this means, roughly, is that for any objects c1,,cksource 52, we can work with φ(x,c1,,ck)source 53. More precisely, we can state the result without mentioning “parameters” as follows. For any formula φ(x,v1,,vk)source 55, whose free variables are all displayed, we have: v1vk((φ(o,v1,,vk)(xN)(φ(x,v1,,vk)φ(s(x),v1,,vk)))(xN)φ(x,v1,,vk))source 57 Evidently, speaking of “having parameters” can make things much easier to read. (In the Set Theory part, we will use this device rather frequently.)

Returning to Dedekind algebras: given any Dedekind algebra, we can also define the usual arithmetical functions of addition, multiplication and exponentiation. This is non-trivial, however, and it involves the technique of recursive definition. That is a technique which we shall introduce and justify much later, and in a much more general context. (Enthusiasts might want to revisit this after the Ordinal Arithmetic chapter, or perhaps read an alternative treatment, such as Michael Potter 2004, pp. 95–8.) But, where N,s,osource 73 comprise a Dedekind algebra, we will ultimately be able to stipulate the following: a+o=aa×o=oao=s(o)a+s(b)=s(a+b)a×s(b)=(a×b)+aas(b)=ab×asource 76 and show that these behave as one would hope.

Dedekind's “Proof” of the Existence of an Infinite Set

In this chapter, we have offered a set-theoretic treatment of the natural numbers, in terms of Dedekind algebras. In the reflections section of Arithmetization, we reflected on the philosophical significance of the arithmetisation of analysis (among other things). Now we should reflect on the significance of what we have achieved here.

Throughout the Arithmetization chapter, we took the natural numbers as given, and used them to construct the integers, rationals, and reals, explicitly. In this chapter, we have not given an explicit construction of the natural numbers. We have just shown that, given any Dedekind infinite set, we can define a set which will behave just like we want Nsource 26 to behave.

Obviously, then, we cannot claim to have answered a metaphysical question, such as which objects are the natural numbers. But that's a good thing. After all, in the reflections section of Arithmetization, we emphasized that we would be wrong to think of the definition of Rsource 32 as the set of Dedekind cuts as a discovery, rather than a convenient stipulation. The crucial observation is that the Dedekind cuts exemplify the key mathematical properties of the real numbers. So too here: the crucial observation is that any Dedekind algebra exemplifies the key mathematical properties of the natural numbers. (Indeed, Dedekind pushed this point home by proving that all Dedekind algebras are isomorphic (1888, Theorems 132–3). It is no surprise, then, that many contemporary “structuralists” cite Dedekind as a forerunner.)

Moreover, we have shown how to embed the theory of the natural numbers into a naïve simple set theory, which itself still remains rather informal, but which doesn't (apparently) assume the natural numbers as given. So, we may be on the way to realising Dedekind's own ambitious project, which he explained thus:

In science nothing capable of proof ought to be believed without proof. Though this demand seems reasonable, I cannot regard it as having been met even in the most recent methods of laying the foundations of the simplest science; viz., that part of logic which deals with the theory of numbers. In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as merely a part of logic I mean to imply that I consider the number-concept entirely independent of the notions or intuitions of space and time—that I rather consider it an immediate product of the pure laws of thought. (Richard Dedekind, 1888, preface)

Dedekind's bold idea is this. We have just shown how to build the natural numbers using (naïve) set theory alone. In the Arithmetization chapter, we saw how to construct the reals given the natural numbers and some set theory. So, perhaps, “arithmetic (algebra, analysis)” turn out to be “merely a part of logic” (in Dedekind's extended sense of the word “logic”).

That's the idea. But hold on for a moment. Our construction of a Dedekind algebra (our surrogate for the natural numbers) is conditional on the existence of a Dedekind infinite set. (Just look back to the theorem that a Dedekind-infinite set yields a Dedekind algebra.) Unless the existence of a Dedekind infinite set can be established via “logic” or “the pure laws of thought”, the project stalls.

So, can the existence of a Dedekind infinite set be established by “the pure laws of thought”? Here was Dedekind's effort:

My own realm of thoughts, i.e., the totality Ssource 76 of all things which can be objects of my thought, is infinite. For if ssource 77 signifies an element of Ssource 78, then the thought s'source 78 that ssource 78 can be an object of my thought, is itself an element of Ssource 79. If we regard this as an image φ(s)source 80 of the element ssource 80, then … Ssource 80 is [Dedekind] infinite, which was to be proved. (Richard Dedekind, 1888, §66)

This is quite an astonishing thing to find in the middle of a book which largely consists of highly rigorous mathematical proofs. Two remarks are worth making.

First: this “proof” scarcely has what we would now recognize as a “mathematical” character. It speaks of psychological objects (thoughts), and merely possible ones at that.

Second: at least as we have presented Dedekind algebras, this “proof” has a straightforward technical shortcoming. If Dedekind's argument is successful, it establishes only that there are infinitely many things (specifically, infinitely many thoughts). But Dedekind also needs to give us a reason to regard Ssource 96 as a single set, with infinitely many elements, rather than thinking of Ssource 97 as some things (in the plural).

The fact that Dedekind did not see a gap here might suggest that his use of the word “totality” does not precisely track our use of the word “set”.Indeed, we have other reasons to think it did not; see Michael Potter (2004), p. 23. But this would not be too surprising. The project we have pursued in the last two chapters—a “construction” of the naturals, and from them a “construction” of the integers, reals and rationals—has all been carried out naïvely. We have helped ourselves to this set, or that set, as and when we have needed them, without laying down many general principles concerning exactly which sets exist, and when. But we know that we need some general principles, for otherwise we will fall into Russell's Paradox.

The time has come for us to outgrow our naïvety.

Appendix: Proving Schröder-Bernstein

Before we depart from naïve set theory, we have one last naïve (but sophisticated!) proof to consider. This is a proof of Schröder-Bernstein (the Schröder-Bernstein theorem in Size of Sets): if ABsource 12 and BAsource 12 then ABsource 12; i.e., given injections f:ABsource 13 and g:BAsource 13 there is a bijection h:ABsource 14.

In this chapter, we followed Dedekind's notion of closures. In fact, Dedekind provided a lovely proof of Schröder-Bernstein using this notion, and we will present it here. The proof closely follows Michael Potter (2004), pp. 157–8, if you want a slightly different but essentially similar treatment. A little googling will also convince you that this is a theorem—rather like the irrationality of 2source 22—for which many interesting and different proofs exist.

Using similar notation as the definition of closure generated from one element, let Clof(B)={X:BX and X is f-closed}source 27 for each set Bsource 31 and function fsource 31. Defined thus, Clof(B)source 32 is the smallest fsource 32-closed set containing Bsource 32, in that:

Lemma on closure of a set under a function

For any function fsource 36, and any Bsource 36:

  1. BClof(B)source 38; and

  2. Clof(B)source 39 is fsource 39-closed; and

  3. if Xsource 40 is fsource 40-closed and BXsource 40, then Clof(B)Xsource 41.

source 35

Proof

Exactly as in the lemma on closure properties.

End of proof.

We need one last fact to get to Schröder-Bernstein:

Sandwich proposition for equinumerous sets

If ABCsource 52 and ACsource 52, then AB and BCsource 52.

source 51

Proof

Given a bijection f:CAsource 56, let F=Clof(CB)source 56 and define a function gsource 57 with domain Csource 58 as follows: g(x)={f(x)if xFxotherwisesource 59 We'll show that gsource 66 is a bijection from CBsource 66, from which it will follow that gf1:ABsource 67 is a bijection, completing the proof.

First we claim that if xFsource 70 but yFsource 70 then g(x)g(y)source 70. For reductio suppose otherwise, so that y=g(y)=g(x)=f(x)source 71. Since xFsource 72 and Fsource 72 is fsource 72-closed by the lemma on closure of a set under a function, we have y=f(x)Fsource 73, a contradiction.

Now suppose g(x)=g(y)source 75. So, by the above, xFsource 75 iff yFsource 75. If x,yFsource 76, then f(x)=g(x)=g(y)=f(y)source 76 so that x=ysource 76 since fsource 77 is a bijection. If x,yFsource 77, then x=g(x)=g(y)=ysource 77. So gsource 78 is an injection.

It remains to show that ran(g)=Bsource 80. So fix xBCsource 80. If xFsource 81, then g(x)=xsource 81. If xFsource 81, then x=f(y)source 81 for some yFsource 82, since otherwise F{x}source 82 would be fsource 82-closed and extend CBsource 82, which is impossible by the lemma on closure of a set under a function; now g(y)=f(y)=xsource 82.

End of proof.

Finally, here is the proof of the main result. Recall that given a function hsource 86 and set Dsource 86, we define h[D]={h(x):xD}source 86.

Proof of Schröder-Bernstein

Let f:ABsource 89 and g:BAsource 90 be injections. Since f[A]Bsource 90 we have that g[f[A]]g[B]Asource 91. Also, gf:Ag[f[A]]source 92 is an injection since both gsource 93 and fsource 94 are; and indeed gfsource 94 is a bijection, just by the way we defined its codomain. So g[f[A]]Asource 96, and hence by the sandwich proposition for equinumerous sets there is a bijection h:Ag[B]source 97. Moreover, g1source 98 is a bijection g[B]Bsource 99. So g1h:ABsource 99 is a bijection.

End of proof.